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This thesis presents an analysis of selected West German
protest movements from the founding of the Federal Republic
of Germany in 19^9 to the present. The purpose is to test
the hypothesis that public opposition to security policies
of the Federal Republic of Germany, as a continuing process,
has enjoyed an increasing amount of success in affecting
national decision-making, and may play a key role in shaping
West Germany's future in the NATO alliance. Social problems
related to the effects of radical counter-cultures are
discussed, as well as speculation about Soviet involvement
in West German protest movements. The recent success of the
Greens/Alternative Party in several local elections in West
Germany raises the possibility that public attitudes may
become less hospitable to the U.S. military presence in West
Germany. This trend could have serious implications for
NATO and for U.S. interests in Western Europe as a whole.
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I. INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE STAGE
The Federal Republic of Germany is a most important
country in both political and economic terms. The
maintenance of good relations between the United States and
the Federal Republic is, therefore, vital in safeguarding
our own interests, as well as those of other allies.
Since the end of World War II, the Federal Republic has
experienced three separate periods of opposition to its
government's defense and foreign policies. This study
examines the three phases, first from an historical
perspective and second, with a view towards elucidating the
political implications that concern each phase.
A. POSTWAR DEMILITARIZATION OF THE WESTERN SECTORS OF
GERMANY
On January 2, 1950, Pastor Martin Niemoller, the German
Protestant leader, was cited in a New York Times article as
having "projected himself on the public scene with recent
statements of nationalist feelings." In advocating the
risk of Communist rule to achieve Germany's reunification,
he stated, "the Germans would rather take the risk of living
under a Communist dictatorship in a unified country than
2
continue as at present with two governments." He implied
that the Germans have the right to formulate their own

country's destiny and to demand that their country be
unified. Niemoller viewed the reunification of Germany as
the condition for maintaining an enduring peace and linked
it to the issue of religious freedom.
The present peace movement in West Germany has roots
extending back to the first few years of postwar Germany.
During that period, the fate of Germany centered around two
questions
:
1) What were the original desires of the German people
following the war?
2) What events renewed the issues of rearmament and
reunification?
After the Nazi government signed its unconditional
surrender in May 19^3, the bulk of the German people were
left exhausted, disillusioned and in a general state of
shock. Internally, their country was in turmoil, with its
governmental institutions collapsed and its cities and
economy ravaged by the war. Externally, the Allied powers
prepared to systematically rebuild the country.
The Western occupying powers, the United States, France,
and Great Britain, all had divergent interests in relation
to the future of Germany, especially in defining the shape
and character of the political and governmental system which
each wanted to see introduced. This posed severe problems.
The Americans placed a great deal of emphasis on the merits

of a self-government system, and realized that the "only way
to re-educate the Germans [in that system] was to give them
the chance to govern themselves again." The British and
later the French were more concerned about the economics of
shouldering responsibility for German internal affairs.
They too ultimately accepted the proposition of allowing the
Germans to rebuild their own ecomony and manage their own
affairs, as a way for France and Great Britain to escape
that burden. Other problems entered the scene when the
Western powers perceived that the armament of West Germany
was necessary in order to thwart Soviet expansionism. More
important were the problems that related to German society
itself.
The reconstruction of German institutions was heavily
influenced by the social and economic trends following the
end of the war. For example, in 19^6 the country's
industrial output fell to approximately 33 percent of its
level in 1936. At the same time, the population drastically
increased due to the flow of refugees into Western Germany
from the Eastern sectors of the old Reich. Although no
social revolution occurred in Germany, the postwar society
was sharply distinguished from what it had been after World
War I. The most noticeable characteristic of change was the
"rate at which urbanization and industrial development had
gone ahead." For example, the agricultural sector had

steadily declined. In 1939, it amounted to 17 percent of
the population. By 1960, it had dropped to 11 percent (in
the Federal Republic of Germany). The industrial sector had
risen proportionately. Other segments of German society
also underwent changes.
The aftermath of the war had a sharp impact on the
position of the traditional elites. The aristocracy, which
had been prominent throughout the administration and the
armed forces, was shattered. Some changes occurred in the
ownership of industry, and new men were found to replace
those who had been associated with the Nazis. Family and
social connections, as well as favorable educational
opportunities, became less significant in light of new self-
made men who rose in areas of politics, administration,
industry, banking and professional services. In sum, these
are the roots of today's pluralistic, pragmatic and stable
7West German society.
Some observers of the postwar German period referred to
it as "point zero", implying that German history reached a
break in its continuity and that 19^5 constituted a new
starting point, a new beginning. Although this attitude
was restricted to a small minority of anti-Nazi leaders, it
seems natural that the direction of German affairs rested in
their hands, while the greater percentage of the society
qturned its attention to the struggle for food and shelter.
10

As was stated earlier, the Western occupation forces had
differing opinions regarding the direction of the future
German state, but they in essence all agreed with the
attitude of a new beginning. The reconstruction was,
therefore, carefully centered around that concept. It began
systematically with the licensing of newspapers and politi-
cal parties, which were monopolized by the previously
mentioned minority of new democratic leaders.
These leaders were members of an older generation, most
of them in their fifties and sixties, who had played
important roles in the democratic parties of the Weimar
Republic. They belonged to such organizations as the
Catholic Center Party, left-wing liberals or right-wing
liberals, or the German Nationalists (DNVP) or the Social
Democrats (SPD). The groups to the right of the SPD formed
the Christian Democrats (CDU), a party consisting of old
Catholic parties, Protestant conservatives in the North and
political Protestantism (CSVD) in the Southwest. Other
liberals formed their own parties, the FDP, DVP, and the
LDP. These latter liberal parties had leaders that had not
occupied key positions in the Weimar Republic, because of
their youth. There would have been many more candidates for
leadership positions, had Hitler not had many of them killed
after the attempt on his life in July 1 944. 10
1 1

With the new start for Germany came a surge of religious
revival. The social plight that befell the German people
after the war acted as a catalyst for this revival, a strong
force which acted upon the German political process by the
way of a large Christian party that encompassed both
Catholics and Protestants, individual dignity, and hope for
a European Union. This religious factor is not to be taken
lightly, for its notion of practical Christianity is the
1 1foundation of Christian Socialism. This religious ferver
was used by the CDU and the CSU as a rallying point that was
often echoed in their topics for speeches such as "the duty
of a Christian in politics, politics conducted from faith,
i p
or the obligations of Christian moral law." Other
political camps such as the liberals and the SPD were also
affected. This new wave of Christian conservatism sprang
from deep-rooted sentiments of the German people, possibly a
result of the preceding Nazi period when human integrity was
all but stamped out .
In postwar Germany, it was easy to correlate the reli-
gious revival and the desire for democracy and federalism;
they were interwoven. Catholics, along with Protestants,
considered such principles as part of the same mission. A
founder of the CDU wrote:
Any serious Christian will have to understand the
deepest roots of the German and Central European
catastrophe in this fateful process of intellectuality
going astray... the secularization of the public and
12

thereby of political life which replaced God with
public idols and finally banned all morality, all
social ethics from its thinking in order to replace it
with a relativizing reason_and, consequently, the
adoration of materialism. ^
The attempt of Bismarck to establish a powerful German
nation-state (and all it implied) was rejected by the new
conservative leaders (CDU/CSU). It was thought that
individual and group interests would be limited by the
demands of the common good, "a harmonious solidarity between
1 4
classical liberalism and Marxian socialism." The idea of
a harmonious solidarity was not only limited to the confines
of the German Republic. The fall of the Third Reich and
national pride and glory prompted a rising belief in
European unity, a Federal Union with a decentralized Germany
as part of a larger confederation of European states. The
reunification of East and West Germany was thought to be
facilitated by the idea of a loose federation of autonomous
1 S
states. The realization of those goals, however, was not
what followed.
B. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
Between the years 1 9^6 and 1948, the United States
changed its attitude towards Germany for two reasons:
first, the switch from the overriding fear of resurgence of
German Nazism to a fear of Soviet aggression in Europe, and
second, the impossibility of maintaining indefinitely the
American Zone and the American Sector of Berlin as separate,
1 f\dependent, occupied territories.
13

In light of the new U.S. core of interests that was
centered around the perceived Soviet threat, the U.S. propo-
sition for a unification of the three Western Zones into a
federal state seemed appropriate. In March 19^8, the
British and the French, together with the United States,
agreed to the joining of their respective occupational zones
and called for a Constitutional Assembly to draft a federal
constitution for the new German state. This event, coupled
with the problems that concerned a breakdown of Four Power
cooperation in Berlin, played a major part in the creation
of the Federal Republic. The Berlin blockade that began in
June 19^8 only quickened the process. In August 1948, the
German officials rejected the idea of a Constitutional
Assembly, because they felt that the word constitution
implied a sense of permanence for the new political commun-
ity. Instead, they drafted the Basic Law for all of Germany
and on May 23, 19^9, it went into effect. 17 What followed
that decree was a set of events that comfirmed the disinte-
gration of cooperative Four Power control over Germany.
From the period of 1948 to 1949, the German leadership
groups of the CDU/CSU and the SPD all agreed that:
1) The territory of Germany extended to the Reich
borders of December 31, 1937.
2) The German Volk was indivisible by its very nature.
Adenauer and the CDU held that the creation of the Federal
14

Republic of Germany was the first and necessary step to this
goal. Adenauer stated:
We approached our work in the firm and unshakeable
intention to obtain the unity of all Germany in this
way, a unity which is and shall remain our goal.
It should be noted that the SPD went along with the creation
of the West German state, but it emphasized the temporary
nature of that state and desired to play down the permanent
character of the new political community.
The character of the German nation at that time is best
described as a sense of national consciousness where the
Germans perceived themselves as a group distinct from all
others. The grounds for this perception were based on the
following points:
1) the perception of a common experience of occupation;
2) the lack of contrary evidence;
3) the presumably temporary nature of the political
separation
;
4) the foreign sources of the temporary situation;
5) the ratification of the Four Power control over all
of Germany after the end of the Berlin blockade;
6) the open border in Berlin;
7) the rather porous border between West Germany and
1 9East Germany.
Nationalism, as a doctrine, was understandably
de-emphasized due to its links with the Third Reich. The
15

West German call for national self-determination, however,
as an inalienable right, seemed to justify the "one-Germany"
claim of the Federal Republic.
In accordance with their feelings for self-determina-
tion, the West Germans viewed the question of reunification
20
as vital to national survival. However, the German
leadership broke into two separate groups, because of
differing views concerning the wisdom of forming a West
German state. The first group consisted of the CDU/CSU led
by Konrad Adenauer. They claimed that the creation of the
Federal Republic was the first step towards reunification.
They assumed that a strong and politically stable West
German state, allied with other Western powers, would
eventually draw East Germany to the West and in the long run
2 1prevent East Germany's political consolidation.
The second political group, the SPD, viewed the attempt
to create a new state as a stepping-stone to reunification
as wrong, because they feared that the Soviets would be
forced to do likewise in the East. Naturally, that would
lessen the chance for any negotiated settlement on the whole
issue. The SPD's plan was to create a neutral, unarmed
Germany as the key to any lasting peace. Both parties did
agree, however, that peace would depend upon a reunified
Germany. The SPD also had another reason for desiring
reunification. Politically speaking, its chief support
16

prior to the Hitler regime had come from the urban areas of
22
central and East Germany.
The CDU/CSU's perception of the Soviet threat was
different than the SPD's. This point is critical in under-
standing the Federal Republic's present policy of
Ostpolitik . The SPD feared a Soviet attack, but much less
than the consequences or dangers of an over-aggressive
Western policy. Any rearmament at all, they feared, would
dash any hope of reunification with East Germany. Although
the SPD was not a Marxist-Leninist party, it didn't rule out
the possibility of becoming a partner with the Soviet Union,
should the notion of a neutral Germany within an all-
European security system become feasible. J
In 19^9, a popularity poll was taken which indicated
some interesting factors. Thirty -one percent of those
polled approved of the CDU and twenty-seven percent approved
of Konrad Adenauer. The first federal election in 19^9,
however, showed an unimpressive victory for the CDU/CSU, an
indication that the German people were unsure of Adenauer's
Westpolitik (see Table 1.1). The CDU/CSU polled thirty-one
percent of the popular vote as compared to twenty-nine
percent for the SPD and twelve percent for the FDP. After
an ingenious move to form a coalition with the FDP and the
German Party (DP), Adenauer was left with a coalition




WEST GERMAN ELECTION RESULTS
LAND NO. OF SEATS CDU/CSU SPD FDP OTHER
Baden-
Wurttenberg 55 26 15 10 4
Bavaria 78 24 18 17 29
Bremen 5 1 3 -- 1
Hamburg 13 3 6 2 2
Hesse 36 9 13 12 2
Lower Saxony 58 12 24 5 17
North Rhine
Westphalia 109 43 37 10 19
Rhineland
Palatinate 25 13 7 4 1
Searland
Schleswig
Holstein 23 8 8 2 5
West Berlin 19 5 9 5--
Total 402 139 131 52 80
SOURCE: John C. Lane and James K. Pollock, Source Materials
on the Goverment and Politics of Germany (Michigan:
Wahrs Publishers, 1964), p. 58.
18

added seats, his election to the chancellery was won by one
24
vote, his own.
The outcome of the election was close for several
reasons. The most important reason, other than the large
number of SPD supporters, had to do with the questions of
rearmament and reunification. Allied powers such as Great
Britain and France were determined in their attempts to keep
Germany from ever again posing as a threat to Western Europe
(under the Allied military government, the German armed
forces were dissolved). The German people were led to
believe that military behavior and habits of thought were
evil, and that no rearmament would be possible for an
indefinite period of time (in fact there was no army for ten
2Syears). J Even the Western Allies reduced their own occupa-
tional forces, until the Berlin blockade and the Korean War
led to a radical change in their attitudes towards the
Soviet Union. Another factor that had an equally discon-
certing effect on Western Europe's own confidence in United
States' protection was the successful Soviet testing of
atomic weapons in 19^9.
In an interview with The Times (London), Adenauer
expressed opposition to the rearmament policy, but added
that if the Allies demanded that the Federal Republic
participate in European defense, it would do so only as a
19

German contingent within a European force. Adenauer
actually viewed rearmament in terms of three priorities:
1 ) no army at all
;
2) a role in a European Defense Community;
27
3) rearmament within the framework of NATO. '
One can readily see that the German people were
originally told that rearmament and a return to military
habits of thought were not the way of the future for the
Federal Republic. Although the attitudes of the Allies
changed, the people of West Germany held on to their views
and demonstrated them in the 19^9 election.
The anti-militarist and anti-military propaganda of the
Allies had a great effect upon the German people, especially
after twelve years of totalitarian rule and six years of
total war—not to mention the effects of World War I. There
was resentment about the quick change in the attitude of the
Allies towards the German military power and skills and many
Germans felt that these "despised" German qualities were
2Rbeing exploited. The mood of the German people still
reflected a strong sentiment for peace and neutrality, which
was discussed earlier. The opposition to rearmament was
particularly strong among the German youth. In Germany they
2Qbecame known as the ohne mich
,
meaning "without me". In
December 1950, for example, students at Bonn University
voted 335 to 150 against rearmament of any kind, and more
20

than seventy percent of the students said that they would
never put on a uniform. It was from these roots that the
West German peace movement grew.
C. BACKGROUND ON PACIFISM AND PROTEST
Two factors combine to make the neutralist and pacifist
movement significant; they are geography and history. Since
the founding of the Federal Republic in 19^9, Germany had
been the locus of East-West division and tension in Europe.
When the original principles for the new German state were
first conceived, the German people desired the lofty notion
of a federal republic with their own brand of national self-
determination and Christian ethic. What evolved from those
hopes and desires is today's Germany, divided into two
separate states, each having a large concentration of
weapons and foreign troops.
The failure to realize the original hopes and desires of
the German people is now a matter of history. What is
relevant, however, are the options that are left open to
them. The peace movement has always offered an alternative
to the present situation in Germany. It proposed a policy
of disarmament in 1950 and a return to German nationalism
and self-determination, not in a militarist sense, but with
a view towards the Federal Republic's legitimate aspirations
to German national unity. In 1957-1958 it proposed a ban on
nuclear weapons and the setting-up of nuclear-free zones in
21

Europe. The campaign against nuclear power plants in 1977
was an attempt to bring about alternatives to save the
environment. The recent protest over the enhanced radiation
weapon (ERW) and the 1979 NATO decision to station Cruise
and Pershing II missiles on West European soil is part of
the peace movement's continuing effort to provide these
alternatives. There is one sentiment among the German
people that escapes all criticism; that is the fear of
another war on their own soil with all the misery and
despair that would be part of it.
22

II. THREE PHASES OF OPPOSITION
West German opposition to security policy has occurred
during three separate phases in the postwar history of the
Federal Republic. An examination of these phases, in a
strictly historical sense, is necessary in order to point
out the issues that were at stake as well as the nature of
the opposition that met those issues.
A. THE MOVEMENT AGAINST REARMAMENT (1950-1955)
On November 22, 19^9 the Western Allies concluded the
Petersberg Protocol as a result of their attempts to enforce
the Potsdam Agreement. The hope, however, on the part of
the Allies to re-educate the Germans toward demilitarization
dimmed in light of the growing number of conflicts between
the West and the Soviet Union, and from 19^7 onwards the
United States considered the possibility of recruiting
German military manpower. At a meeting in London, from May
11 to 13, 1950, the Foreign Ministers representing the three
Western allied nations agreed that "the Federal Republic
must begin to take an active part in the Atlantic
Alliance."-* When the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950
the planners of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were
faced with a new situation. They became concerned over the
possibility of an armed Soviet attack that would drive the
23

Western Allies back to the Atlantic coast in a matter of a
few days. The German perception of the effects of the
Korean War is best presented by Adenauer, who stated in his
memoirs that:
The German situation was not unlike that of Korea.
Germany too was divided into two parts: one half was
under communist dictatorship and the other
characterized by free and democratic institutions.
Strong Soviet forces were stationed [in the East]; In
the German West there were only the relatively weak
forces of the occupying powers--from a military point
of view, we Germans are quite defenseless.
What resulted from this concern over the Soviet threat was
the New York Conference on September 19, 1950, where the
Western Allies announced that they would consider any attack
against the Federal Republic or against Berlin as an attack
upon themselves and that they (Western Allies) would
strengthen their military forces in Germany. At the same
time, a special security police force of 30,000 men was
authorized to combat the growing threat of a much larger
Soviet-sponsored East German para-military force known as
Bereitschaf ten or "Alert Forces" that was formed in early
19^8. By April 19^9, these East German troops were
estimated to number more than 50,000, in addition to the
7
regular police formations. For unknown reasons, the
reaction by the Western Allies to this East German military
build-up was not revealed until May 23, 1950. On that day
the U.S. Ambassador at Moscow handed the Soviet Foreign
Minister a Note that expressed the U.S. Government's concern
24

over this matter and reiterated the accepted principle of
complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. The
Note went on to state:
...The Soviet Government is simultaneously creating a
military force of considerable size and strength in
Germany in violation of its solemn international
commitments. By this and other like actions the Soviet
Government has destroyed world confidence in the
sincerity of its promises and has created throughout
the world widespread doubt as to its specific
intentions. If the Soviet Government wishes to restore
in some measure international conf idence . . . it cannot
fail to dissolve immediately the militarized units
which it has set up in Eastern Germany.
The Soviet reply of October 19, 1950, merely stated that
the original Control Council arrangements provided for the
formation of an armed police force and added that the
decision of the New York Conference revealed the intention
of the West to train a real army in the Federal Republic.
The exchange of accusations between the Soviets and the
Western Allies continued throughout October 1950. As the
Pleven Plan, which called for the formation of an integrated
European Defense Community (EDC) or European Army, was being
considered, the response from German opposition groups to
rearmament grew in strength. The West German opposition in
the early 1950s main_ly consisted of pacifist-minded
nationalists, certain religious organizations, the 3PD under




The strongest opposition to rearmament came from
Schumacher, who argued that the Federal Republic's partici-
pation in the Western alliance would destroy any hope of
reunification forever. He asserted that:
The Soviet Union might yet agree to some sort of
arrangement that would allow East Germany to rejoin
West Germany, and that therefore everything should be
done to induce the Russians to explore such a
possibility, and absolutely nothing to discourage
them. ' '
Moreover, Schumacher stated that the New Europe, referring








i pKARTELS . Schumacher's opposition to rearmament was a
reflection of his assessment of the postwar situation, which
can be characterized by two basic factors. First, he
believed that the Western capitalists would attempt to
exploit the resources, both physical and human, that existed
in postwar Germany. Second, Schumacher was concerned with
the opinion of Germans on both sides of the Iron Curtain.
According to him, the future of Germany was ultimately in
the hands of the German masses. J Mass public opinion is
discussed in the following chapter.
Schumacher's arguments against rearmament, referring to
the proposition by Adenauer and the Western powers, included
the following:
1) An objection to the establishment of miltary forces
under the control of the old military elite;
26

2) A rejection of the proposed inclusion of German
contingents in a European army under NATO command. (He
1 4
viewed this as a denial of equality to the Germans.)
What should be noted about Schumacher's opposition to
rearmament is the fact that he did not reject the idea of
rearmament entirely. He maintained that if the situation
arose where the German people would have to make sacrifices,
they had to be given the guarantee that they would be
fighting for their own security and not for the interests of
1 5
other countries. J
Another form of opposition to rearmament was generated
by the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches in Germany.
The most vocal of these religious pacifist groups was the
Evangelical Church (EKD) under the leadership of Pastor
Martin Niemoller, the Church president in Hesse. From a
historical perspective, the EKD argument to this day has
consistently been based upon the hope that Germany would one
day be reunified. 16 In 1950, the EKD Synod in Berlin
Weissensee stated:
Countless anxious people all over the world cry today
for peace ... Hardly has the last war ended when arms are
being produced for the next. Our own people [is] at
the mercy of powers confronting one another and filled
with distrust. The Iron Curtain dismembers our nation
and major conflicts could break out here any moment.
Yet no one knows what will become of humanity if modern
weapons of destruction are used in a war which then no
one car
is ucj
in control . '
27

Dr. Niemoller's position on rearmament was similar to
Schumacher's in that his arguments were designed to show
that "Germans must rely on themselves for their spiritual
and political salvation rather than on the occupying powers
who are in Germany for their own purposes rather than for
1 8Germany's good." Dr. Niemoller's approach to the
rearmament issue, towards the end of 1950, became more
political than spiritual. In an address to his old church
in Berlin, he summed up his arguments by stating:
Only the West Germans could be the neighbors of the
Germans in the East. It was a matter of indifference
to the Russians, the Poles, and the Czechs whether
millions of Germans in the East lived or not. France
would even be very glad if these Germans were dead, for
the French could then sleep the sounder. In the final
analysis the British and Americans had no neighbors but
themselves. y
The West Berliners, however, were provoked into demonstra-
tions over Niemoller's sentiments, considering their own
feelings that all of Berlin would have been part of the
East German state, had it not been the strong hand of the
Western Allies. Because of these and other similar state-
ments on Niemoller's part, a conference of the leaders of
the Evangelical Church was called to consider the proper
response to Niemoller's position. The outcome of that
conference was a compromise in that the Church called on
its own members to observe their duty in public life, but
requested all Church officials "for their duty to the





Niemoller, however, continued to voice his opposition to
rearmament on political grounds. In a speech delivered
before the Land Synod on November 28, 1950, Niemoller stated
that he would risk everything to prevent the attempt to
force arms into West German hands. In a heated exchange of
views, he accused the Evangelical Church of copying the
Roman Catholic Church and stated, "Martin Luther would be
2 1
ashamed to have his name on your lips." In this same
speech, Niemoller repeated his allegation that the Federal
Republic was "conceived in Rome and born in Washington."
The Press service of the CDU issued a burning response to
Niemoller's statements by calling them "monstrous" and
describing him as being "an impossible person in public
life." 22
On March 10, 1952, the Soviet Foreign Ministry passed an
unexpected Note to the American Embassy that consisted of a
2?draft for a German Peace Treaty. J The Note in essence
urged the Western powers to sign a peace treaty with Germany
as soon as possible and implied, in principle, consent to a
reunited Germany through free elections. Several months
worth of diplomatic exchanges between the Western powers and
the Soviet Union resulted in a flat rejection of the Soviet
proposal for the following reasons:
...the Soviet Union refused to allow a United Nations
commission to enter East Germany ... the main obstacle...
was the further Soviet condition that the reunited




This last point concerning neutrality of the German state
was regarded by Adenauer and the Allies as risky for the
future balance of Europe. A Federal Republic divorced from
the Atlantic Community would have been open to subversion
and eventual absorption into the Soviet bloc. If the plan
were accepted, the Soviet Union would have gained a great
deal. Even though the plan was rejected, the Soviets
claimed a propaganda victory.
In the midst of the events surrounding the March 10th
Soviet proposal, the opposition to German rearmament con-
tinued. On April 17, 1952 Niemoller restated at a Frankfurt
Press Club his theory that "peace could be preserved in
Europe if the Western countries do nothing which might
indirectly precipitate war, and that Germany can serve best
2S
as a buffer between east and west."
In a move to formulate a common stand against rearma-
ment, a group of widely diversified personalities were
brought together at Hannover. Along with Niemoller there
appeared Gustav Heinemann , the former Federal Minister of
the Interior who resigned his office in protest to the issue
concerning a German contribution to defense; Dr. Gereke , the
former Minister for Food and Agriculture in Lower Saxony who
was expelled from the CDU after having entered into trade
negotiations with the Communist administration in the
30

Eastern Zone; and Dr. Noack, leader of the Nauheim circle
and an advocate of German neutrality.
On August 20, 1952, Kurt Schumacher died, and with him a
strong political voice of opposition to rearmament. His
successor, Erich Ollenhauer, lacked the magnetism of
Schumacher, but his standing in the party went unchallenged.
On September 28, 1952, the SPD voted unanimously for a
program of action to oppose the entrance of the Federal
Republic into the European Defense Community. One important
change to the original program that was drafted by
Schumacher dealt with the bearing of arms. The new program
declared that "the party will strive for an effective system
of collective security in which Germany can take part on a
27footing of equality and without endangering her reunion." '
John Foster Dulles visited the Federal Republic on
February 5, 1953, and met with the leaders of the SPD and
CDU. The representatives of the SPD told Dulles that they
could not recognize the European Defense Community treaty
without a decision of the Constitutional Court. In keeping
with the new SPD program, they proposed to Dulles the
formation of a German national army in the framework of a
comprehensive alliance. Dulles replied that it was in the
better interest of peace that French and German troops be




An important, although less vocal, form of opposition to
the rearmament issue came from the West German Trade Union
(DGB) . It is interesting to note that the Union opponents
of rearmament had two definite advantages in the debate:
1 ) the lack of enthusiasm for rearmament on the part of
the minor officials and members in general;
2) The apparent unwillingness, or inability, of the
government to follow precedent by offering labor domestic
concessions in return for its cooperation in the foreign
policy field. 29
In 1952, a reshuffle of the DGB occurred when the top
leaders of the Union attempted to support the side of the
administration. The militant temper of the Union members
against rearmament, however, was still kept in the back-
ground, which is evident in the DGB 1954 resolution on the
issue. Couched in vague terms, the resolution did not take
a definite stand in opposition to the government's policies.
It did form a consensus against competitive rearmament and
called for a need to reunify Germany as a precondition to
world peace. It also proclaimed the Union's readiness to
participate in the maintenance of democracy. The final
content of the resolution, which included supplementary
changes, was patterned after the corresponding resolution
that the SPD adopted at its Berlin convention that same
summer. In essence, the Union's resolution presented the
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DGB as being opposed to "any rearmament contribution so long
as all possibilities for negotiation have not been exhausted
with the goal of obtaining international reconciliation, and
so long as the unity of Germany can not be obtained. " J
In the spring of 1955, the DGB participated in the
Pauls-Kirche meeting along with various members of the SPD
and church-connected groups. The manifesto that resulted
from that meeting demanded a speedy reunification through
negotation rather than policy of military integration with
o 1
the West. The West German Trade Union members of the
older generation expressed these views for several reasons.
They believed that the military protection of the Western
allies, coupled with the civilian establishment of the
German authorities, provided a convenient device for hand-
ling foreign and domestic issues. A number of trade-union
leaders often stated that "German sovereignty has no
meaning." An integrated German military would destroy the
chances of a democratic development in Germany. The younger
generation, however, saw the rearmament issue as an oppor-
tunity to instill the fighting spirit of former times.
They argued that the vague terms of the 1954 resolution and
the participation of Union's leaders in the Paul-Kirche
movement were to be interpreted as pointing to a more active
opposition to rearmament. The state of mind that framed a
majority of the members, however, remained one of
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semi-abstentionism where German labor remained on the
sidelines . J
With Adenauer's victory in the September 1953 elections
came a clear mandate for the formation of the European
Defense Community. The events of June 17, 1953, where an
East German mass uprising was crushed by Soviet tanks, and
Washington showed its inability to respond, gave emphasis to
that mandate. The French rejection of the EDC on August 30,
1954, and the admission of the Federal Republic into NATO on
May 5, 1955, marked an end to the first phase of opposition
to West German security policy.
It is ironic that following the October 3, 1954 London
Conference, Adenauer was quoted in Per Spiegal as stating:
I am 100 percent convinced that the German national
Army will be a greater danger to Germany and to Europe
when I'm not here any more... Use the time while I'm
still living! God knows what my successor will do when
I'm no longer around, when they no longer have to
follow clearly prescribed paths, when they are no
longer bound to Europe. ^
B. BAN THE BOMB (1957-1958)
The debate over the introduction of atomic weapons onto
West German soil opens the second phase of opposition to
West German security policies. On April 12, 1957, eighteen
of West Germany's leading nuclear physicists created a furor
in the Federal Republic and the rest of Western Europe by
going on record against atomic arms. What prompted this
opposition was a statement made by Adenauer on April 4,
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1957, during a press conference, where he declared that "the
tactical nuclear weapons were basically nothing but an
improved form of artillery" and that "the Bundeswehr should
^4
not be denied the newest types of weapons.
"
J On April 14,
1957, Adenauer spoke before a political meeting in Cologne
where he replied to the Gottingen declaration. In an
attempt to explain why he favored the stationing of atomic
weapons on German soil, Adenauer made reference to the fact
that the Federal Republic rearmed so as to save the German
people from falling under the yoke of Communism and the
Soviet Union. Adenauer further stated, "If the Americans
have small atomic weapons, if the French, the Italians, the
Belgians and the Dutch have them--and the German troops do
not have them—that would mean the dissolution of the whole
defense wall of the Western world against Soviet Russia."-*
It is important to remember that 1957 was an election
year in the Federal Republic and the SPD needed such an
issue to use as a cornerstone to their platform. That is
why within 24 hours after the declaration by the 18
scientists and the reply by Adenauer, the planting of atomic
weapons on German soil had become one of the hottest
political issues in Germany's election campaign.
The opposition to atomic weapons came from three areas:
the SPD, the science community, and the Protestant Church.
The science community portrayed their objection to atomic
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weapons in the April 12th declaration. The content of the
declaration was based primarily on several political
considerations. First, the atomic armament of individual
nation states like France, Germany and Sweden would result
in a world wide catastrophe. The great powers, therefore,
have an over-riding interest in preventing the acquisition
of atomic arms by small sovereign states for the sake of
world peace. Second, the large-scale acquisition of atomic
weapons by the West is not really a guarantee of peace and
freedom. The power that these weapons represent is only
useful towards the safeguarding of peace as long as they are
never used. Third, to be convincing in recommending atomic
disarmament to all countries, a government must convince the
world that it does not want atomic arms for itself.
On the question of disarmament, the declaration further
asserted that the great powers could not unilaterally forego
atomic weapons under the present political conditions, but a
small country such as Germany could do it. There were
advantages to disarmament that were viewed by the signers of
the declaration. "The Soviet Union has many other weapons
and political power resources. The West holds itself to be
less shy of foreign inspectors than the Soviet Union.
"
J
The declaration also called for a reduction in conventional
weapons and a stabilization of the whole peace system. As
C. F. von Weizsacker stated:
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We cannot remain immobilized, like a rabbit before a
snake, looking at one clanger only. Our purpose is not
to banish the atom from the world; this would be an
impossible task. We have to learn from it what needs
to be changed in general; if we do not, a similar
danger will be again upon us in a short time. Just to
abolish atomic weapons, and otherwise to engage in wars
as in the past, would be like throwing the alarm clock
out of the window hoping to avoid having to get up.^°
In the diplomatic arena, the Soviet Union expressed its
views on the introduction of atomic weapons into the Federal
Republic. On April 27, 1957, and again on May 4th, the
Soviets made mention of the "dangers which would be entailed
by setting up nuclear weapons belonging to the Western
powers on the territory of the Federal Republic."-17 The
Soviets made further accusations that the Federal Republic
intended to arm the German forces with atomic weapons.
Perhaps these accusations were based on some truth in light
of statements that were made by Franz-Josef Strauss, the
Defense Minister. Strauss alluded to the use of tactical
atomic weapons as compensation for the shortage of military
manpower and the abbreviated term of service of the
Bundeswehr . In a March 1957 article in Aussenpolitik
,
Strauss stated:
...the fact remains that the position and influence of a
people depend as well upon the strength and dependability
of its allies as upon its own military power ... Those who
ask us, --quite rightly— to accept Soviet power as a
reality, should after all not deny their own people the
i , 1
right and the opportunity to become likewise a reality.
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The second form of opposition was presented by the SPD
under the leadership of Erich Ollenhauer. After the events
in April, four weeks of public discussion and debate over
the issue of atomic weapons swept through the Bundestag.
Earlier in April, the SPD tabled a motion appealing to the
Western powers to discontinue test explosions pending an
agreement on their control, limitation and eventual prohi-
bition. The SPD also demanded that the federal forces not
be equipped with nuclear weapons and that the Western powers
42
not be permitted to place their weapons upon German soil.
The most vocal participants in that debate were Adenauer and
Strauss, who represented the CDU, and Ollenhauer and Fritz
Erler, who represented the SPD. By November 10, 1957, the
Bundestag rejected the SPD proposals, voted on a limted test
ban, and expressed the hope that the German people would
receive an adequate protection from its allies to prevent a
4^Soviet attack. J
In the aftermath of Adenauer's overwhelming victory in
the September 1957 elections, the Polish Foreign Minister,
Adam Rapacki
,
proposed a peace plan to the United Nations
General Assembly. The essense of the plan called for a
nuclear-free zone in Central Europe to include East and West
Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The plan received a
broad approval from the SPD and its chief advisor on
4 4
military affairs, Helmut Schmidt. The Western powers,
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including the Federal Republic, however, all rejected the
plan in light of the suspicion over the advantages that
would be gained by the USSR from such a plan and the USSR's
successful launching of Sputnik on October 4, 1957, only two
days after the original proposal.
At this point, the opposition to atomic weapons, in the
form of the SPD, had lost most of its battles. Feeling that
the momentum of a successful election campaign was still on
his side, Adenauer called for a debate to finally decide on
a resolution concerning the outcome of the atomic issue.
The heated 4 day debate took place in late March 1958, with
elites from the CDU and the SPD firing verbal abuses at each
4 C>
other. J The final government resolution stated that "the
Federal Government would do everything in its power to bring
about general controlled disarmament." The resolution went
on to say that "meanwhile, the expansion of the Bundeswehr
must continue in conformity with NATO requirements— It must
46be equipped with the most modern weapons." At the same
time, the resolution rejected the conclusion of a peace
treaty with the two German states and the formation of a
German confederation. In effect, the resolution virtually
authorized Strauss to purchase 24 Matador missiles from the
United States, along with the Honest John, Corporal and




The equipment of the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons
will be carried out only if no disarmament agreement is
forthcoming.
It is interesting to note the similarity of that concept to
the resolution that was passed 2 1 years later over the NATO
two-track decision.
In light of the public support against atomic weapons,
such as the Henschel vehicle works walkout in Kassel by
several hundred workers, the SPD decided to take the issue
to the people by launching the Kampf dem Atomtod (Fight
MQ
Atomic Death) campaign. 3 A large amount of support for the
campaign came from the German Trade Union (DGB) which
announced in Hamburg on March 28, 1958, its decision to
organize demonstrations against nuclear weapons. The
executive of the DGB stated that "it was convinced that the
majority of the people did not approve of the Bundestag
resolution" and demanded that the government hold a
referendum. The executive called on the German people,
especially workers, officials, professors, doctors,
students, and mothers to join in the campaign. The DGB
campaign resulted in several small strikes and protests.
Workers in a Volkswagen plant laid down their tools while in
other areas dock workers protested. Nearly 50,000 students
rose up to protest the new weapons by marching through the
streets of Hamburg carrying signs that read "Remember




Another form of protest centered around the idea of a
public referendum. On April 10, 1958, the city assembly of
Frankfurt voted 42 to 15 to hold such a referendum, while
similar proposals were made in Bremen, Lower Saxony, Hesse
C 1
and North-Rhine Westphalia.^ The CDU attitude toward such
a referendum was that any referendum was a manipulation of
the constitution, which excludes such political activities;
the CDU referred the issue to the Constitutional Court.
Meanwhile, more demonstrations occurred throughout April
1958. In Hamburg, for example, workers and students marched
through the streets and brought public transportation to a
halt. With the organizational help of the SPD, 7,000
Germans demonstrated in Bremen and another 5,000 in
Mannheim. The "Fight Atomic Death" campaign drew little
support from West Berliners, however, as the SPD witnessed a
growing dilemma. The campaign's most willing supporters,
namely the Communists, were stopped from participating in
the movement, because their association with the campaign
spelled out its end. For Berliners, the short range of the
missiles to be installed in the West presented a potential
danger in war and they were more receptive to this argument
c pthan ones concerning ideology or religion.
The religious opposition to nuclear weapons was less
significant than that which came from SPD or the Trade
Unions. Dr. Niemoller once again attempted to use his
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pulpit in the Evangelical Church as a sounding board for
advocating the campaign against atomic death. Niemoller
,
however, was later banned from using the pulpit in such a
manner, due to his accusation that those who supported
atomic weapons were atheists. J
By the end of the summer of 1958, the broad-based grass
roots of the movement had wilted. One reason for its
decline was the Constitutional Court's decision not to
permit referenda in the SPD-ruled city states of Hamburg and
Bremen. Another reason dealt with the success of the CDU in
the Land elections of North-Rhine Westphalia, an SPD
stronghold. A more detailed analysis of the movement's
performance is given in the next chapter.
C. THE NEW "PEACE MOVEMENT" (1977-1982)
1 . Enhanced Radiation Weapons (ERW)
In the years that followed the 1957-1958 debate over
the introduction of nuclear weapons in West Germany, two
internal developments deprived the opposition of its clear
anti-nuclear and pro-disengagement identity. First, in a
new bid for political advantage, the Social Democratic Party
(SPD) decided to change its image and strategy by adopting a
new platform. In November 1959, it jettisoned its position
concerning class warfare along with its opposition to
rearmament and argued that the Federal Republic must play
its full role in the defense of Western Europe within the
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55framework of NATO. J Second, the protest over the Vietnam
War, coupled with the West German student revolts of the
late 1960s and early 1970s overshadowed any opposition to
56
rearmament. The campaign against enhanced radiation
weapons (ERW) and intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)
witnessed a rekindling of the anti-rearmament movement of
the late 1950s and introduced the third phase of opposition.
In May 1977, a meeting of the Atlantic Alliance
discussed the possibilities of improving NATO's defense
57
efforts by adding ER weapons to its arsenal. A Washington
Post article later revealed the remarks of that meeting to
the public, which resulted in several debates both in the
58United States and Europe.
The most intense debate occurred in West Germany
where the bulk of the ER warheads were to be deployed and
would probably be used in the event of a Soviet attack. One
should recall that when tactical nuclear weapons were first
introduced into NATO, the Federal Republic had many reserva-
tions about their possible use. In 1962, Helmut Schmidt
voiced a grave concern over the civilian damage that might
occur as a result of a tactical nuclear exchange on German
soil. He stated, "When the defense of Europe is seen to
entail its nuclear destruction, the European incentive to
permit the use of nuclear weapons on its soil diminishes
5 Q
rapidly. 7 In 1976, Schmidt repeated his concern when as
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Chancellor he signed a German White Paper on national
defense
:
The initial use of nuclear weapons is not intended so
much to bring about a military decision as to achieve
political effect. The intent is to persuade the
attacker to reconsider his intention, to desist in his
aggression and to withdraw...
The ER weapon was tacitly endorsed by the CDU/CSU
and the right wing of the SPD, given the notion that the
weapon was presented as being less destructive. One of the
strongest criticisms, however, came from within the SPD left
and was represented by Egon Bahr, who was at that time the
General Secretary of the party and the architect of Willy
Brandt's Ostpolitik . He declared the bomb to be a "symbol
for the perversion of human thinking" and claimed that the
development of such a weapon proved that "mankind is about
to go mad." In continuing his criticism, Bahr also noted:
"It seems to be an ideal of latest progress that it is
easier to clear away human bodies than to remove the rubble
of cities and factories." In an article that appeared in
the SPD newspaper Vorwarts
,
Bahr attacked the desire to
purchase ER weapons by labeling it as a kind of political
greed where "the opposition fall all over themselves in
their attempt to spend beyond their budget just to acquire a
new type of weapon."
While opposing ER weapons in a moral sense, Bahr
also doubted that they could act as an effective deterrent.
44

The argument centered around his belief that the weapon
lowers the nuclear threshold due to its smaller yield, that
it can be used more purposefully, destroys less and,
therefore, has an enhanced probability of use. Bahr went on
to criticize the deterrent capability of ER weapons by
arguing that the Soviets would probably have a similar
weapon stockpiled shortly after the U.S. deployment, thereby
neutralizing that level of U.S. capability. -5
Perhaps the most convincing of Bahr's arguments
pertained to the effect that ER weapons would have on the
growing relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal
Republ ic
:
Detente demands a long term policy creating confidence
through new agreements ... Detente demands steps to be
made toward reduction and arms limitation and not
toward intensified armaments and the introduction of
new systems which would create new instability.
Other members of the SPD offered similar arguments.
Willy Brandt, for example, expressed his opposition to ER
weapons by making reference to the danger of lowering the
nuclear threshold. Weapons of this type "must not become
the substitute for a conventional defense capability.
Karsten Voigt, a spokesman for the younger members of the
SPD left, stressed that the ER weapons blurred the
"firebreak" between conventional and nuclear war and pointed
out that those weapons could lead to a limited nuclear war
fought only in Europe, thus creating a process decoupling
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the United States from its obligation to help defend Western
Europe. Christian Kraus and Alfons Pawelczyk both
commented on the Soviet threat and the balance of forces,
while Horst Ehmke noted that the deployment of ER weapons
raised certain risks for the success of the Federal
Republic's Ostpolitik :
If millions of people yearly can visit each other in
divided Germany today... then this is a practical
success for the human rights of these people. We do
not want to jeopardize this practical success by
making a show of muscle. '
In December 1977, Hans Gu'nter Brauch summarized the
objections against ER weapons by compiling a list of ten
specific arguments:
1) The neutron weapon is not a strategic necessity.
2) The neutron weapon lowers the nuclear threshold
and makes war once again possible.
3) The danger exists of the use against friendly
units and against the civilian population.
4) The costs of the neutron weapon endanger a cost-
effective conventional anti-tank defense.
5) The introduction of the neutron weapon makes
nonproliferation efforts more difficult.
6) The neutron bomb endangers the ongoing arms
control negotiations.
7) The neutron weapon is not clean.
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8) Against the introduction of the neutron weapon
exist numerous objections of international law.
9) Storage of neutron warheads (on West German
soil) can lead to a burden on German-American relations.
10) Psychological weakening of the West.
On January 20, 1978, the Federal Security Council
determined the offical West German position which
emphasized
:
1) The Federal Republic is not a nuclear-weapons
state and therefore does not participate in decisions on the
production of nuclear weapons.
2) In the event of an American decision for
production, opportunities ought to be used to bring ER
weapons into arms limitation negotiations.
3) The government is prepared to declare that it
will allow the stationing of ER weapons on German territory,
if within two years after the American President's
production decision the West has not abandoned deployment
because of appropriate results from arms limitation
negotiations
.
4) In the interests of the alliance, it would be
necessary in any case not to base ER weapons only on German
soil .
5) The Federal Republic must not be assigned any
special position with the nuclear powers the U.S., France,
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and Great Britain that would separate it from the other NATO
partners; at the same time, the relationship with the Soviet
Union and the other neighboring European countries must be
69taken into consideration.
In light of this position, on March 19, 1978, West
Germany as well as its allies in NATO consented to a three
part program that dealt with the U.S. insistence on a public
European acceptance of ER weapons deployment prior to
President Carter's production decision. In essence, the
program called for the U.S. to make a production decision
public, attach the ER weapons to arms control and reduction
talks between the East and West and stipulate that if, after
two years, the negotiations failed to result in any
agreements, then the NATO allies would accept ER weapons.
Thus, either the United States or the Soviet Union would
force the weapon on the Europeans, and the Germans could not
70be blamed in either case.
Due to a number of reasons, which included a lack of
understanding of the West German perception, President
Carter postponed a decision on full-scale production of the
7 1ER weapons in April 1978. Schmidt, who was open to
criticism from the CDU/CSU and the SPD left, remarked in an
interv iew
:
With hindsight I think the President has kept his
options open with a sober, sound strategic decision.
Of course, the same decision would have been better if
we [Germans] hadn't had to go through the irritating
process of the last few months.'
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Apart from the criticism within the West German
government, German opposition to ER weapons flowed from
various environmental and pacifist groups. One such form of
opposition sprang from the Green Action Future (GAZ) founded
by Herbert Gruhl , a former CDU member. The GAZ executive
committee consisted of scientists and freelancers who at one
time were all members of the Federal Republic's four major
parties. The relatively new party has its base in Bonn and
claims that its platform is centered around the principles
found in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Portions of the Green Manifesto point out the party's
relationship with environmental issues:
Our policies have to take into account our children and
grandchildren and future generations. The conservation
of the ecological bases of all life--air, water, earth,
the plant and animal world—are preconditions of their
survival . ' -*
The GAZ adopted a program for foreign policy which called
for "partnership and peaceful co-existence with all
countries, including those of the East bloc, rejects all
atomic weapons and in particular the 'life-annihilating'
neutron bomb, and aims for an atomic-free zone in Europe and
74gradual disarmament among all powers."'
As a postscript to the ER weapons issue, the Carter
administration revised its policy in October 1978, by
allocating funds for the delivery vehicles and authorizing
the production of certain warhead components. Schmidt was
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left with no other option than to re-iterate the January
1978 Federal Security Council position.
2. The NATO Two Track Decision
This dual decision (of December 1979) by the Alliance
is militarily an indispensable component of the
strategy of the West, politically a test of the
solidarity of the Alliance. In the present inter-
national situation, anyone who questions this dual
decision, or one of its two parts, brings the Alliance
into question .
'
This statement by Helmut Schmidt reflects the
culmination of long and arduous debates that occurred
throughout Western Europe and the United States prior to the
NATO two track decision.
As far back as November 1976, the Nuclear Planning
Group first decided to design a program for the ground-
launched Cruise missile (GLCM) . The decision to add new
intermediate-range nuclear forces to the European arsenal
was principally in response to the Soviet production and
deployment of the sophisticated SS-20 missile system. For
its part, prior to 1969, the United State maintained a total
of 201 medium and intermediate-range cruise and ballistic
missiles in Britain, Italy and Turkey. By 1969, all of
these weapons had been withdrawn from Europe with the
remaining nuclear force consisting of the Pershing I SRBM,
the Poseidon SLBM and various types of aircraft such as the
F-111, F-4, A-6 and A-7. 76 The foreseeable danger in the
growing imbalance between the Soviet and NATO forces in
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Europe was clearly expressed by Schmidt when he addressed
the SPD Caucus of the Bundestag on February 6, 1979:
When the Soviet Union puts into service every year 30
to 50 new SS-20 missiles, each with at least three
warheads, and also puts into service 30 to 50 new
Backfire bombers, one can see that in the course of the
1980s... the Soviet Union could theoretically be put in
the position of using military intimidation for
political purposes. '
Herbert Wehner , the SPD parliamentary leader, took
an opposing view to Schmidt's assessment that the new Soviet
weapons were offensive in nature. In representing the views
of the SPD left, Wehner argued that the levels of nuclear
destructive power already held by the East and West were
awesome, and that further Western increases in weapons from
the West will accelerate an arms race, resulting in
7 8defensive Soviet countermeasures . In May 1979, Wehner
modified his argument by stating that some new NATO INF
might be necessary, while insisting that NATO and the
Federal Republic consider arms limitation and disarmament a
7Qtop priority . ' J
Throughout the March 1979 INF debate in the Federal
Republic, representatives from the SPD left contended that
the Soviet military build-up was not aggressive in nature.
Fearing that the modernization of NATO's nuclear arsenal
might disrupt the process of detent, they advocated the use
of INF only as a bargaining chip in negotiations which they





Although the Soviet threat was more readily
recognized by the conservative element of the Schmidt
government, the pressure from the left wing of the SPD as
well as some domestic political considerations more or less
impelled Schmidt to move towards the notion of arms
negotiations rather than actual deployment. Thus he coupled
the pace of INF modernization to that of arms control.
Schmidt stated
:
Concrete modernization measures could be limited to the
extent which arms control negotiations—e.g., in Salt
II—would effectively limit Eurostrategic systems in
East and West. 50
The Schmidt government's central points concerning its NATO
two track policy follow:
1) The members of NATO (except for France) have
jointly decided on modernization and are jointly responsible
for it
.
2) The necessary decision in favor of modernization
was linked with an offer to the Soviet Union for immediate
negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons. The ideal
objective of such negotiations would be to make the
deployment of these weapons superfluous.
3) Our 1954 renunciation of atomic weapons will
remain unchanged. The new medium-range weapons will be
produced by the United States only and remain under American
control. Deciding on their use is the sole responsibility




4) The new medium-range nuclear weapons are to be
stationed in Great Britain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands




The December 1979 NATO decision brought with it a
re-awakening of the anti-rearmament and pacifist groups that
were discussed in the previous two phases. Unlike the other
two phases, however, the new opposition from outside of the
government is a broad-based coalition comprising more than
1400 different organizations including pacifist religious
groups, trade unions, leftists, Communists, environmental-
ists and some alternative groups, all of which are linked
together by the common desire to campaign against the INF
82deployment
.
The strongest voice within the religious community
has been the Evangelical Church of Germany (EKD). The
increased tension on the political scene has led to a
revival of the EKD's long post-war struggle for peace. Over
the past 32 years the efforts of the EKD have led to several
contributions to the nuclear debate. The most important
contribution is derived from the Heidelberg Theses on War
and Peace in the Atomic Age (1959). The insights found
within these areas lead to the following conclusion:
The Church must recognize participation in the attempt
to safeguard peace in freedom by the presence of
nuclear weapons as still being a possible Christian
way of acting. -*
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In light of the present INF issue, however, the EKD endorsed
the assertion that "War is contrary to the will of God."
The Church further stipulated that its judgement permitting
a Christian's participation in a nuclear war is "not valid
for all time, but bound to a specific geopolitical situa-
84
tion, and can thus be overtaken by events." The EKD
presented its position on tactical nuclear weapons in this
manner
:
The continuance of wars makes it necessar y . . . to
attempt to prevent the use of nuclear armaments in
local conf 1 ic ts . . . and considers it to be a tragic
mistake if one were to imagine that the continuance of
limited wars constituted a stable situation. It is
not the exclusion of nuclear weapons from warfare* but
the exclusion of war itself that must be our aim.
At the initiative of the Council of the EKD, a working group
called the Committee for Public Responsibility was formed
and held a conference on "Militarism and the Arms Race" from
26 to 28 March 1979. The purpose of the conference was to
draw the guide lines for a position paper for the Church on
the INF issue. The committee concluded that:
Priority must be given to a limitation of the arms race
and to fresh efforts to achieve disarmament in the _,
light of the hazards attaching to weapons technology
.
L
The Committee also made it clear that the Church could not
accept the notion of living without the protection of
armaments, due to the possibility of all types of political
blackmail and military subjugation. As alternatives to the
54

present issue concerning the "highly unstable deterrent
system," the Committee pronounced that:
1) Military defense measures are justified in order
to preserve a country's self-determination. The dilemma
arises in one's interpretation of a weapon's offensive or
defensive nature.
2) Other less threatening possibilities to ensure
peace should be sought out to include those measures that
87
serve detente and strengthen international law. '
Another strong voice within the religious community
of the Federal Republic comes from the Catholic Church
through its Pax Christi organization. Their platform is
based on the assumption that force and militarism are being
systematically practiced and rehearsed and that they can
88therefore be systematically forgotten through disuse.
According to this platform, the reduction of force
can be achieved through full cooperation of all concerned
and within the framework of detente. In theory, this calls
for a continuous exchange of views between the East and West
in order to prevent a disastrous conflict which could
otherwise occur due to misperceptions and misunderstandings.
The Pax Christi organization cited as an example the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan where "punishing the other side by
isolating it for a wrong move, could threaten the existence
8 Q
of both sides." y Accordingly, Pax Christi places a great
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deal of emphasis on detente and unilateral disarmament
gestures
:
General and complete disarmament as the objective of
any peace policy aimed at reducing force and increasing
social justice is beyond question. In view of the
dangers inherent in the present overkill potential,
disarmament remains a pressing imperative even if it
entails (comparatively small) risks. The willingness
to accept these risks must be taken as a yardstick of
society's ability to make peace.
The Christian churches appear to be an excellent
recruiting ground for the pacifist members of the campaign
against INF deployment. Despite agreement on the basic
principle of non-violence, pacifism within West Germany can
be categorized into three main variants. The first type is
termed legal or organized pacifism
,
which only condemns the
illegal form of violence. This type of pacifism actually
permits the use of force which is regulated by the law. The
second type is termed radical-religious pacifism
,
which will
not oppose violence with violence, not even of the legal
sort, and is thus opposed to self-defense. The third type
is termed radical-totalitarian pacifism
,
which opposes the
use of force as a means of erecting a world empire free of
violence. Manfred Worner, the deputy leader of the CDU/CSU
Bundestag Fraktion and new Defense Minister of the Federal
Republic, further describes German pacifism as a "highly
differentiated phenomenon." Worner refers to at least five
basic categories of pacifist currents that are reflected in
the new peace movement:
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1) The "pacifism of faith", which attracts
essentially representatives of organized religions and
appeals to the conscience of the individual citizen.
2) The "pacifism of fear", which represents a
mixture of war psychosis and fear of the future.
3) The "pacifism of welfare", whose adherents are
basically intent upon protecting their own economic well-
being against the rough waters that face the German
economy—and doing so by scuttling the Federal Republic's
defense outlays in favor of heightened subsidies to the
welfare state
.
4) The "pacifism of expedience", whose
representatives take their orders straight from Moscow in
working diligently for the unilateral disarmament of the
We st
.
5) A "reunification pacifism", which might also be
called a "nationalist-neutralist pacifism". Its represen-
tatives have little in common with the naively idealistic
youth who make up the bulk of the peace movement. Instead
qi
they come from intellectual circles of the SPD left.
The pacifist factions offer some of the more radical
alternatives to official security policy. Their aim, in
general, follows closely behind their motto, "Make Peace
Without Weapons." They hold to the belief that the Soviet
Union would be more than happy to cease with its arms
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build-up given the proof that no military threat exists from
the West. This is to be accomplished by Western unilateral
disarmament moves.
The church influence within the peace movement is
extremely strong, which is evident in the Christian-inspired
peace groups that have blossomed all over West Germany.
Some of these groups include "Christians for Disarmament",
"Living Without Arms", and the Shalom groups. The
Federation of German Catholic Youth, with its 650,000
members, provides a sizeable support for the peace
Q2
campaign. On June 18, 1981, a large gathering of lay
Protestants met at the Protestant Church Conference in
Hamburg. The discussion between the 150,000 participants
was largely dominated by the issue of disarmament. During
the course of events, Helmut Schmidt took part in a
televised debate with several representatives of the
Protestant Church. The debate centered around the INF
issue. Concerning the Chancellor's view of what the correct
relationship between the Church and the peace movement
should be, Schmidt replied:
The people in the Church must make sure that they do
not lapse, under the pressure of the peace movement,
into a God-is-wi th-us theology, i.e. into an inverted
imperialism a la William II. During the days of
Emperor William II, the belt with which soldiers were
issued bore the inscription: God is with us. And
people imagined 70 years ago that the policy pursued
then... was indeed blessed by God and that it accorded
with God's wishes. Today, we must pay attention lest
many people with critical views on the policy which is
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necessary for Germany start to believe that their
opinions are the only ones of substance in God's eyes.
We have no use for a God-is-with-us theology or policy
in the sense that somebody holding a different view has
the sole right to invoke God and Christ. ->
Despite Schmidt's views, the Christian churches have
not only succeeded in establishing a good rapport with the
many factions of the peace movement within West Germany, but
have become an important link to the many church-backed
organizations throughout Europe and the United States.
Perhaps the most centralized organization within the
new peace movement and one that is a national political
party is called the Greens. The origin of the Greens dates
back to the middle of the 1970s when West German nuclear
power plants were being considered. As an environmental
group, the Greens originally formed their political goals
around protecting the environment from the ravages of
industry and urbanization. Thus their campaign against the
nuclear power plants was seen as a means of protecting that
environment. With time, the Greens began to face the issue
of disarmament and the prevention of war, as well as the the
more traditional political programs such as:
1) guaranteed apprenticeship programs for young
people and the right to a job;
2) a 35-hour work week;





4) a ban on cigarettes and liquor advertising
5) speed limtis for all German roads, especially
the autobahns. 94
The Alternative List (AL), a political party that
has its grass roots in West Berlin, is the quasi-partner to
the Greens. The party is dedicated to the various problems
than plague West Berlin such as the shortage of low-cost
housing. The ideology of the AL, however, differs entirely
from that of the Greens. The AL "uphold an idea of
'individual self-fulfillment' over the demands and pressures
of modern society, reject the consumer society as being too
conformist and passive, and view a return to a form of pre-
industrial society as a goal worth striving for."^
Aside from the major religious and political
factions within the new peace movement, several notable West
German personalities have pledged their support to the
movement's protest over INF deployment. Gert Bastian, a
retired Major General of the Bundeswehr , is currently the
Greens top advisor on military affairs. Bastian, together
with seven other retired military leaders from Italy,
Norway, Portugal, Greece, Netherlands and France sent a
memorandum to the Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers of
96the Alliance which presented their views on the INF issue.
An examination of the memorandum reveals several interesting
insights pertaining to the perceptions of these highly
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influential personalities. First, concerning the nature of
the "real" threat, Bastian and the other co-signers of the
memorandum state that we are threatened by:
a description of our adversaries that alienates people
from the idea of peace and strengthens models of
thinking and behavior which favor conflict and war,
thus making them unable to accept a cooperative
existence of all peoples;
adventurous policies measuring the value of
international relations only with the scale of one's
own benefits and not recognizing—or even rejecting--
opportunities for negotiations on vital issues of our
era
;
our lack of understanding of the interests of Third
World countries, their strive for independence and
their just claims for economic development, social
progress, and national prestige including non-
interference into their internal affairs;
arrogance towards socially disadvantaged population
groups in our countries who carry the whole burden of
inflationary price increase, mass unemployment, bad
housing, and broad scale crime and who do not seem
ready any longer to accept that huge sums flow into




Second, they display a deep concern over what they
view as irrational behavior by the NATO countries in
thinking that an arms build-up in Western Europe will
guarantee more safety. They see an increasing madness to
nuclear armament which must inevitably end in a disaster.
The only course for NATO, therefore, is pursuance of detente
with the Soviet Union. To aid in their argument, the eight
former NATO military leaders draw upon the Harmel Report of




Above all, a constructive use of the Alliance in the
interest of detente can pave the way to peace and
stability in Europe. USSR and U.S. participation will
be necessary to find effective solutions for the
European political problems.
The former military leaders offer several alternatives to
the missile deployment:
1) Based on the fact that the Soviet Union did not
use its conventional superiority to threaten Western Europe
during the post-war years, NATO should seek to go back to a
strictly conventional force along with the Warsaw Pact.
2) NATO should combine its military policy with
programs of economic aid in concert with the EEC.
3) On the basis of a de-nuclear ized zone in Europe,
NATO's strategy should be designed around a modern
conventional armed force which can present a high deterrent
value; a highly developed defense that can dispense with
long-range offensive weapons; the organization of homeland
militias to make military occupation by an enemy force
impossible
.
4) Increasing national sovereignty within NATO and
abolishing the types of situations where the U.S. can carry
out its own nuclear policy without consulting its West
European allies
.
5) In the interests of detente, NATO should cease
from trying to expand the size of the Alliance.
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Bastian further argues that President Reagan's "Zero
Option" policy, which calls for the dismantling of certain
Soviet intermediate-range missiles (SS-4s, SS-5s , and
SS-20s) in exchange for halting the deployment of the
ground-launched Cruise and Pershing II missiles is totally
one sided. Bastian stated, "After all, it [the zero option]
calls for the dismantling of already existing nuclear
weapons down to zero by the East, while none of the West's
systems that are already in place (Pershing I) would be
reduced
.
,.99 It is evident that Bastian has misinterpreted
the meaning of "Zero Option" and of the existing INF
balance. The Pershing I, for example, is incapable of
striking the Soviet Union from Western Europe, while the
USSR has numerous systems capable of striking Western Europe
in addition to the SS-4s , SS-5s , and SS-20s
.
Similar views and alternatives have been presented
by a retired Luftwaffe colonel, Alfred Mechtersheimer , who
is a well-known critic of the Tornado MRCA Procurement, as
well as a member of the "Alternative Defense" Working
Group. Mechtersheimer cites several arguments to sub-
stantiate his anti-nuclear position. First, U.S. strategic
thinking has shifted from deterrence to a war-fighting capa-
bility. Second, the sophisticated SS-20 has been "vastly
overestimated" and could only carry one warhead. [The
weapon actually has a MIRV warhead.] Third, Reagan "regards
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101detente as possibly a task of secondary importance."
Mechtersheimer 's answer to the question of U.S. interference
into West German affairs lies in a "massive public criticism
and collective citizen's protest against the nuclear
modernization that will enlarge the German government's room
1 02for maneuver vis-a-vis the U.S.."
On December 9, 1980, one of the numerous initiatives
that Mechtersheimer called for took place at a press
conference in Bielefeld where a small group within the SPD
(originally 150), calling themselves the "Courage for a
Better Future," appealed to the SPD national executive, the
SPD Bundestag Faction and the Chancellor. While touching
upon some of the previously mentioned arguments to the
modernization issue, they urged that:
1) Negotiations on limiting theater nuclear weapons
systems in Europe be taken up without further delay.
2) By repealing the NATO decision, the deployment
of medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe will be
prevented
.
3) The Vienna MBFR negotiations are to be speeded
up
.
4) No neutron bombs should be deployed to the
Federal Republic.
5) The arms budget should be cut in favor of social
investments (social security instead of missiles.)
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6) A European conference on disarmament should be
1 CH
convened and carried through as soon as possible. J
A similar petition known as the Krefeld Appeal was
organized and sponsored by the Greens on November 16, 1980.
The petition attracted nearly 2 million signatures, in only
a few months, which may indicate the popular attraction to
the issue of disarmament in West Germany. The rapid growth
rate of the new peace movement became evident in several
large scale demonstrations that occurred in the fall of
1981. On October 10, 1981, 250,000 people took to the
streets and parks in Bonn to protest the 1979 NATO decision.
Signs with slogans such as "WE ARE NOT AMERICA'S GUINEA
PIGS" and "WE DON'T WANT TO FIGHT REAGAN'S WAR" point to
what is perhaps the heart of the problem, Ich Habe Angst (I
am afraid )
.
Through the rest of 1981 and into the summer of 1982
the new peace movement gained in momentum. On June 10,
1982, President Reagan visited the Federal Republic in order
to take part in a NATO summit. Upon his arrival in Bonn,
300,000 West Germans staged a well planned demonstration to
protest U.S. defense policies. Initially, the major
organizers of the demonstration, "Action for Reconciliation"
(a West Berlin-based group with ties to the EKD), and the
Greens party feared that the protest would result in a
rallying support for the ant i -Amer ican sentiment that
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predominantly rests with the younger generations of West
Germany. What did result, however, was a full endorsement
for a worldwide end to nuclear arms and a withdrawal of
1 OSthose weapons from both East and West European countries.
The West German peace movement has made attempts to
join forces with other similar campaigns in Western Europe
and the United States. In June 1982, an appeal was sent to
the American people through an organization called the
"Gruppe Fr iedens-Manif est " and appeared as an article in the
New York Times . The appeal stated the need for regional
disarmament and a change in regional arms policies as well
as a defense policy based on non-offensive weapons:
We stand for a nuclear-free Europe in East and West
,
based on the lowest level of exclusively defensive
conventional armaments. Carrying out these measures
would considerably lessen the danger of war... The risks
involved in this alternative .. .are small compared to
the risk... of the arms race and the policy of
deterrence.
The appeal sought to tie the Nuclear Freeze campaign in the
United States with the movement in Western Europe and, in
particular, West Germany:
. . .we are impressed by the strong and growing peace
movement in America and by its efforts to freeze the
nuclear arms race on both sides. Our efforts here are
closely connected with that goal... In all our political
activities we intend to stress the congruence of the
goals of the European and the American peace movements
...Let us together in the United States and in Europe
commmit ourselves to bringing an end to the arms
i3C6 • • •
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The appeal was signed by more than 200 prominent clergy,
academicians, authors and members of parliament.
The same common thread that unites the various
factions of the West German peace movement also unites those
of other West European countries, thus making the peace
movement international in scope. Mient-Jan Faber , the
leader of the Dutch Inter-Church Peace Council (IKV), which
serves as a model to anti-nuclear organizations in other
parts of Western Europe, has stated that "Arms control, the
step-by-step approach, has not worked. Our over-all goal,
which is all nuclear weapons out of Europe, will be a long
1 09process, but it can begin here." The peace movement in
Great Britain, under the leadership of the campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament (CND), has rapidly grown to over 250,000
members in the last two years. The latest anti-nuclear
movement to develop is the Italian "Movement for Peace and
Disarmament," which organized more than 200,000 protestors
in Rome during October 1981.
With respect to West Germany, we have so far
examined the new peace movement from its factions within the
religious community, the environmentalists, and some
prominent individual supporters. What remains is the
dogmatic and undogmatic "new leftist." One of the basic
elements of the new peace movement has been the willingness
to accept persons and groups with a wide variety of concepts
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and aims. A vast majority of the movement's members are
between the ages of 13 and 25. There exist within this age
bracket a number of complex alternative and leftist groups
,
a product of the late 1960s and early 1970s when West German
youths protested against the Vietnam War and, in particular,
against the conservative educational structure of the West
1 1 1German universities.
Within these factions, several interesting features
of the peace movement begin to surface. Richard Lowenthal
states that "the return of the repressed in a society whose
collective sense of identity is disturbed may well be the
deepest reason for the raging inner restlessness behind the
1 1 2
outward stability." What he is referring to is a type of
counter-society or alternative culture which abhors the
labor-oriented industrial society and favors new values of
self-realization. William Griffith points out that this
"romantic disdain for materialism, consumerism, economic
growth, bureacracy, liberalism, bourgeois lifestyle and
conventional morality" is not a new phenomenon, but actually
began prior to World War I and existed in the Weimar
1 1 3Republic. J The German term Angst has a special meaning to
these social dropouts. In its literal translation, the word
means fear. In figurative terms, the word refers to a long-
time fear of nuclear war and has become a kind of cult
within these groups, supporting their claim that an
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alternative society, one without politics, is the only way
to survive.
Along with these youth oriented Alternative groups
are the various leftist organizations who, as well as the
Alternatives, became the recipients of the defunct Extra
Parliamentary Opposition (APO), a protest movement of the
late 1960s which directed a political and cultural
revolution against the dominant norms of West German
society. It was from this organization that many of West
Germany's terrorists such as the Baader-Meinhof gang got
their start. The leftist organizations, in general, include
the radical "K-groups" (the new left), the SPD left with
their Young Socialists (Jusos), the FDP Youth Group, the
Youth Committee of the West German Trade Union (DGB) , and
1 1 4the Moscow oriented Communists.
Politically, the Jusos constitute the most important
leftist organization for the younger generation. The Jusos
passed a resolution on peace, detente and disarmament at
thier congress in 1980. The resolution listed the major
factors behind the new fear of war. All pointed to the
fault of the United States in its "policy of military
superiority," while at the same time the resolution played
down the role of the Soviet SS-20s. 115
Finally, the new peace movement has a small, but
highly visible counterpart in the German Democratic Republic
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through the East German Protestant Church. The movement's
slogan is "Swords into Ploughshares" and calls for a
reduction of SS-20 missiles and tanks in Eastern Europe. In
February 1982, the East German movement staged a
demonstration in Dresden with 5000 protesting young Germans
waving the familiar slogan, "Make Peace Without Weapons."
Unfortunately, it is difficult to know the nature and extent
of the movement, but we do know that the Church distributed
approximately 20,000 armbands with the outlawed sword into
ploughshare slogan on them. The most important outcome of
these demonstrations in East Germany is the feeling of a
1 1 fc\
positive unification with their counterparts in the West.
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III. THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
The policies of governments are heavily influenced by
their domestic politics, and these politics make them
heavily dependent on the political impact of these
kinds of movements...
A. COMPARISON OF THE THREE PHASES
1. The Opposition (1950-1958)
A comparison of the three phases of opposition to
West German security policies, in terms of the success or
failure of the movement's ability to change those policies,
will prove that the current peace movement shows a greater
potential to affect decision-making in the Federal Republic
than the past two phases.
Between the years 1950 and 1956, a German contri-
bution to the defense of Western Europe was certainly
unpopular among the masses in West Germany. Poll results
showed that opposition to rearmament increased from 45
percent in the fall of 1950 to 50 percent in 1951, while
only 22-26 percent of those surveyed approved. A poll
taken in January 1951, showed that 46 percent of the
respondents thought that it would be better to "try to unite
with East Germany, and as a neutral nation .. .keep out of
conflicts between East and West."-'
Although a high percentage of West Germans
disapproved of rearmament, the issue was not the highest
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priority of concerns (see Table 3-D* During most of the
postwar period, West Germans were more concerned about the
state of the economy and, in particular, their "daily
bread." Their chief political concern was the partition of
Germany, and her position between East West. Most of the
West Germans who were polled, however, indicated that they
would oppose any concession that would result in an increase
in communism in the Federal Republic. Further surveys
suggested that, as long as the cold war lasted, West Germans
preferred to side with the United States and its other
European allies. In 1952, an Institut fur Demoskopie poll
showed that two-thirds of the respondents said they felt





The Most Urgent Task Facing the Federal Government 1950-1957
(percentages )
Reunification Housing Employment Refugees
1950 1 14 25 14
1951 12 10 11 12
1952 16 10 7 8
1953 12 9 8 6
1954 14 13 7 3
1955 21 9 3 2
1956 25 6 1 1
1957 27 5 1
Source: EMNID Poll, Per Spiegel, April 17, 1957
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This attitude towards the West began to change from
1955 to 1956. Until that time, West Germans were fairly
certain that, if the Soviets attacked, the Western powers
would defeat them. By 1956, the Institute for Market and
Opinion Research (EMNID) found that over half of their
respondents preferred a policy of neutrality, while
identification with the West slipped to slightly over one-
third. The reason for the increased attitude towards
neutralism reflected a deep-seated fear of war, especially
one that might be fought on German soil. In 1956, West
Germans indicated in several surveys that they viewed the
Soviets as being equal to the United States and they were
not sure that victory in war could be achieved by the West.
Furthermore, West German public opinion was divided on the
preferable course, an avoidance of involvement in the East-
West struggle for fear of atomic war, or the seeking of
safety in close association with the West for fear of the
Soviet Union. A Deutsches Institut fur Volksumf ragen
(DIVO) poll that was released March 1, 1957, showed that
from 1953 to 1956 those in favor of non-involvement
increased from 20 percent to 30 percent. Early in 1957,
however, as a result of Soviet intervention in Hungary, the
figure fell back to 20 percent.
With respect to the issue of rearmament, the concern
did not compare in urgency with reunification and economic
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considerations. Several polls showed that only 10 percent
of the respondents considered it a pressing issue since
1951. Most of the opposition to rearmament came from
German women and to a lesser extent from the young men. In
a May 1955 poll, 46 percent of the men who were surveyed
approved of rearmament, while 47 percent of the women
opposed it. Within the 18-24 year age bracket, 48 percent
opposed rearmament, while the majority of those who favored
Q
it appeared to be in the 60 year or older bracket. Thus
the West German government's handling of the rearmament
issue was not driven by domestic popular pressure, but as a
response to international tensions.
But it would be altogether too simplistic to accuse
the West German government of being totally unmindful of
public attitudes. The levels of German armament planned for
by NATO in the early 1950s (500,000 men with 18 months
compulsory service) were substantially reduced. By March
1959, the West German armed forces were forecast to have no
more than 200,000 men with a conscription lasting only 12
months. At a time when France and Great Britain were
spending 7 and 8 percent of their national income on
defense, West Germany's contribution was only 4 percent.
This was not an indication of bad faith on the part of the
Adenauer government, but suggests the probability that the




The failure of the opposition to stop the Federal
Republic's desire to rearm is evident in two events. The
first event was the 1953 general election, where the CDU
under Adenauer gained an absolute majority in the Bundestag
for the first time. It is interesting to note that the
election occurred at a time when Adenauer's policy toward
rearmament was not a politically popular one. Despite Kurt
Schumacher's vigorous attempt to gain a political advantage
from the rearmament issue, Adenauer made it clear that no
matter what the temper of mass opinion, he refused to
reverse his position. Schumacher died before the 1953
elections took place, and, although there still remained
widespread popular opposition to rearmament, "the promised
restoration of German sovereignty and of the gains in
Germany's international position impressed many voters."
The second and most obvious event was West Germany's
joining NATO on May 5, 1955. By 195**, the issue of
rearmament had to be resolved, as it was a precondition for
the Federal Republic's admittance into NATO. What this
meant for the West Germans was the choice between gaining
sovereignty for the Federal Republic through military
security, or the possibility that the Soviet Union might
allow the reunification of a neutralized Germany. A 1954
Institut fur Demoskopie poll asked its respondents the
following question, "What do you think: should we enter
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into negotiations with the Russians over the reunification
of Germany only after we have put up German troops in West
Germany, or is it more advantageous for reunification to
negotiate with the Russians before we have a West German
1
2
army?" The results showed that 36 percent said rearmament
should come first; 31 percent felt that negotiations were
more important ; 21 percent were opposed to rearmament under
1 3
any circumstances; and 12 percent were undecided. J Thus
the opposition to rearmament in the first phase appeared to
have been ineffective.
The second phase offers a clearer example of the
lack of influence that the opposition had on the Federal
Republic's decision-making body. In 1957 and 1958, the
government's decision to allow nuclear weapons upon West
German soil triggered an unprecedented crisis in German
domestic politics. Acting as a climax to the rearmament
debate of the 1950s, it was a case where the government once
again found itself in solid opposition to public opinion.
As the debate over nuclear weapons began, Adenauer
was caught in several political embarrassments. First, his
statement in April 1957, which referred to tactical nuclear
weapons as "merely a further development of artillery,"
touched off the whole atomic issue. As the eighteen
scientists went to the public to protest such an outrageous
statement, Adenauer issued an ill-considered response that
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further riled the public. In all fairness to the late
Chancellor, it should be pointed out that his political
embarrassments were partially a result of the confusions





Adenauer was a staunch believer in the use of
conventional forces to thwart a Soviet attack. A New York
Times article in July 1956, however, reported the "Radford
Plan" which called for a radical cut back in U.S. conven-
tional forces. The fact that Adenauer received no advance
information about this plan, so infuriated him that he
delivered a public attack on American policy. Adenauer
implied that the United States seemed to be backing away
from its promise to defend Europe on the ground. He further
stated
:
...this new plan would mean shifting the principal
emphasis to atomic weapons. This is a mistake, for to
counter an East German invasion of West Germany with
nuclear weapons would without doubt trigger an
intercontinental rocket war . . . I am of the opinion that
it is of special importance to localize small conflicts
that may occur, and fop this we need divisions with
conventional weapons.
To make matters worse, the introduction of nuclear
weapons also added fuel to arguments concerning conventional
forces. A 1957 study of German public opinion on military
questions, conducted by Hans Speier, who at that time was
the head of the Social Science Divison of the RAND
corporation, showed that those who opposed rearmament, for
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any reason, argued that conventional forces had been made
obsolete and that it was an unnecessary cost and burden to
1 f\
maintain them.
Attention is then focused on the September 1957
general elections in the Federal Republic, where public
opinion concerning Adenauer's security policies was to be
tested. The CDU, under the leadership of Adenauer, as in
the 1953 campaign, won an overwhelming victory. The CDU's
public relations apparatus, along with the moral support of
the Catholic Church, the financing by the business commun-
ity, the backing of the Western powers, and the events in
Hungary, all aided the CDU campaign. The only real campaign
the SPD could muster was their opposition to atomic weapons,
along with a variety of social demands and a vague foreign
1 7policy. ' There are several good reasons why the SPD failed
to rally with the anti-nuclear sentiments and direct those
feelings into a viable political platform. Adenauer
basically discredited the anti-nuclear campaign by equating
the goals of the SPD with those of the Soviet Union and East
Germany. As Josef Joffe puts it, "the message was crude and
effective: if nuclear abstinence was good for the Soviets,
1 8it had to be bad for the Germans." Thus public opinion,
although it appeared to be against the policy towards
nuclear weapons, demonstrated, as it did in 1953, its
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confidence in the CDU 's ability to keep the Federal Republic
a secure and sovereign state.
The opposition to nuclear weapons, both within the
Bundestag and from the "Fight Atomic Death" campaign, wilted
by the summer of 1958. One reason concerned the failure of
the Constitutional Court to allow anit-nuclear referenda in
1 Qthe SPD-ruled city-states of Hamburg and Bremen. 7
Josef Joffe suggests three lessons that can be
derived from the struggle over nuclear weapons "which define
20
some crucial parameters of German defense policy." First,
public opinion clearly dictated the unpopularity of nuclear
armaments. In a poll taken in 1958, 52 percent of the
respondents favored a general strike to prevent such an
2 1
occurrence. In March 1958, EMNID polls showed that 83
percent of the respondents were opposed to the construction
of launching pads on West German soil. With such public
opposition to an issue, it would have been a mistake to make
public the debates within the government.
Second, the failure of the opposition to stop the
placement of nuclear weapons upon West German soil points
out that no matter how explosive such issues can become, the
"capacity of one party, especially on the left, to convert




Third, the decision to place nuclear weapons upon
West German soil caused the sharpest deterioration of
German-Soviet relations to date and was a factor in
precipitating the Berlin Crisis of 1958-1962. Unlike today,
however , where Ostpolitik could be at stake over such an
issue, in 1958 the Soviets could only offer warnings that
the weapons would heighten international tension.
2. The Opposition (1977-1982)
The ultimate success or failure of the movement
against ER weapons or INF is inconclusive at this point, but
the controversy over both issues offers an instructive case
study in the continuity of the goals that were formulated in
the 1950s and the changes concerning West German domestic
politics and diplomacy.
The similarity to the first two phases concerns the
public attitude towards rearmament. In the case of ER
weapons, the Federal Republic was again placed in a
precarious position where public opinion was overwhelmingly
opposed to the idea of a "neutron bomb." On April 13, 1978,
a Die Welt article stated that only 28 percent of those who
knew about the weapon (approximately 75 percent of the total
population) believed that it would enhance West European
defense. A November 23, 1981 EMNID poll revealed that only




Several variables that didn't exist in the 1950s,
however, were set in motion during the ER weapons
controversy
.
1) In the 1950s, the SPD was in opposition and
moving to the right. In the third phase, however, the SPD
was in power and moving to the left.
2) Unlike the strong unity that existed with the
governing CDU party in the 1950s, the governing SPD had deep
internal political difficulties.
3) The opposition to security policy is a more
broad-based group of politicians, pacifists, ecologists and
"alternative culture" people.
4) Since the introduction of Qstpolitik
,
the West
German government now has to deal with both deterrence and
detente .
5) The public attitude in West Germany towards the
United States is slipping, while at the same time there is
less credit given to the Soviet threat.
Throughout the ER weapons issue, Helmut Schmidt's
government was caught between trying to appease the voting
public on one side and trying to keep together a strained
German-American relationship on the other:
Given the line-up of forces at home and abroad, the
government could not move very far in either direction.
If it came out clamoring for the bomb, it would
galvanize the opposition of the SPD and FDP left wing
and antagonize the Soviet Union. If it rejected the
American offer... it would draw the fire of the
Opposition and alienate the Americans.
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Thus the crucial point to be recognized here is not whether
the West Germans accepted or declined the ER weapons, but
who would get stuck with the blame for either outcome. In
light of this reasoning, it is not surprising that Schmidt
attempted to shift the burden of decision over to the
Americans
.
The political consequences of the ER weapons
controversy emerged in the form of a dilemma between
deterrence and detente, which is more sharply illustrated in
the INF issue. Lothar Ruehl predicted in 1979 that:
...if ER weapons for tactical battlefield use were not
to be introduced for "strategic and political" reasons,
then sooner or later all other NATO nuclear weapons on
the European continent would have to become subject to
such objections and so the entire program of moderniza-
tion of nuclear strike forces in Europe would become
the object of political vetos.
The results of recent public opinion polls in the Federal
Republic give Ruehl's prediction a sense of reality. An
examination of these results not only reveals the extent of
the new peace movement's political effectiveness towards
opposing INF, but also brings to light some sociological
aspects that effect the political structure within the
Federal Republic.
With regard to the question of INF, EMNID reported
that 36 percent of those West Germans who were surveyed are
for the NATO dual track decision, while Allensbach reported
that it found 53 percent in favor. When confronted with a
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choice of negotiating for arms limitations or restoring a
military balance, 64 percent of the respondents chose
negotiations versus 34 percent who chose the latter,
revealing West German concerns over nuclear modernization.
As to the outcome of the negotiations, most West Germans
expect the superpowers to come to an agreement, but at
different levels:
--36 percent expect the establishment of a zero
basis
.
--23 percent expect a solution in terms of mutual
arms reduction and deployment of American medium-range
missiles below the level presently announced.
--39 percent think a breakdown in negotiations will
occur and will eventually lead to an arms race.
Concerning the influence of the new peace movement,
25 percent of the respondents considered the movement to
have a direct effect upon the outcome of the disarmament
talks ; 25 percent thought that the movement could keep the
West from closing the armaments gap ; and 49 percent
considered the movement to have no influence at all. When
confronted with the question concerning their reaction to
the peace movement, the West Germans responded in the
following manner:
--10 percent rejected the peace movement.
--19 percent had misgivings about it.
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—22 percent were indifferent to it or did not care
about it.
— 39 percent found the peace movement basically
good, but did not wish to participate in it.
— 7 percent said it may be possible for them to play
an active role in the peace movement.
--1 percent would definitely play an active role.
--1 percent were already active in the peace
movement
.
The effects of the new peace movement, particularly
the Greens/Alternative faction, on the German political
structure are noteworthy. The opposition to rearmament in
the 1960s never formed a united political front, which is
one reason why it failed. The opposition to INF, however,
is far more intense and is politically represented by the
SPD left and the more radical Greens/Alternatives, who have
new seats in 6 of the 11 Land parliaments (West Berlin,
Bremen, Lower Saxony, Baden-Wur ttenburg , Hamburg and Hesse).
What this implies is a departure from the three decades of
established political parties, presenting them with concern
over the lost votes and, in the case of the Free Democrats,
survival. If the current trends continue into the Federal
elections scheduled for March 6, 1983, it could alter the
27political landscape in the Federal Republic decisively.
34

The October 1982 no-confidence vote, which ousted
Schmidt and brought the CDU/CSU back into power, poses
further implications for the issue over INF. The SPD is now
wearing its traditional robes as an opposition party in
debates over armament. It is possible, therefore, to see a
shift of emphasis within the SPD from the center to the
left. What this implies is a situation whereby the SPD
left, under the leadership of Willy Brandt, Erhard Eppler
and Egon Bahr would court the political clout of the
Greens/Alternatives with the hope of gaining enough votes to
hold the majority.
The scenario seems unlikely, at this point in time,
given the unwillingness of the new parties to make political
compromises or join into a coalition with the SPD. As the
Greens Chairperson, Petra Kelly, states:
This system must be able to put up with an authentic
grass-roots opposition outside the parliament along
with the parliamentary opposition. I would like a
strongly-based movement like ours to have a voice in
parliament--but .not just so we can join a coalition and
acquire power.
In Hesse, for example, where the Greens presently
hold the balance of power in the Land parliament, the Social
Democrats are actively pursuing their support. In return,
the Greens are demanding a "weapon-free zone—that all
nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons be removed
from Hesse--, a halt to the expansion of the Frankfurt
airport and a replanting of the areas already cleared, an
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end to nuclear energy in Hesse, and a ban on further
29
autobahn construction."
The protest over the INF decision not only stimu-
lates political controversy within the Federal Republic, but
also brings to the surface a continuing undercurrent of
social characteristics that have evolved since the postwar
years
:
The Brussels decision not only evoked one of the most
intense domestic political controversies since the
founding of the Federal Republic, but also illuminated
far beyond the borders of our country the magnitude of
the mortally dangerous risk of advancing nuclear
armament and the scope of that risk, affecting each and
every individual.
The social consequences that appear as a result of the peace
movement's underlying fear of nuclear war, and an overall
lack of confidence in the Federal Government's ability to
prevent it, transcends the limits of neutralist and
nationalist tendencies that were developed in the Federal
"3 1
Republic during the postwar years, as well as the 1950s.
The original desires of the West Germans, which were
discussed in Chapter One, are converging with those of the
emerging new generation.
In attempting to understand the essence of the
problem with the rise of nationalist and neutralist
attitudes in West Germany, Pierre Hassner summarizes the
general concept of a new national consciousness, what he




1) The official conservative variant, expressed by
Chancellor Schmidt, is anchored in the Western framework and
in the reality of Germany's division into two states, but
expresses a greater desire for an independent judgement on
foreign policy and a national priority for maintaining (if
need be against the wishes of the United States) the
conquests of detente and Ostpolitik, in terms of security
for West Berlin, of human contacts between the citizens of
the two German states, and, possibly, of common interests
between .. .the middle states of Central Europe.
2) The Utopian variant, expressed by the Greens and
the Alternatives, calls for the two Germanies to refuse
their occupied status and their membership in the two
alliances, in order to form at first, perhaps, a confedera-
tion but then certainly, a united neutral German state.
3) The strategic or manipulative variant [where]
the policy starts from the official Ostpolitik aims to
progress through little steps .. .towards a goal close to that
of the Utopian position. This view is expressed by the
Brandt wing of the SPD: Egon Bahr, Gunter Gaus and Peter
Bender [who] seize upon the peace and the nuclear issue to
advance, via nuclear free zones and a "security





4) The psychological and moral variant [which]
refers to the youth movement and to its evolution from state
to society, from great international causes to local con-
cerns and from there to a new feeling of cultural identity




This last variant is, perhaps, the most crucial,
because the seemingly radical youth movement (or counter-
society) has become a political force with both staying
power and international significance. What emerges from
this are sociological and political factors that link
pacifism, neutralism and nationalism together with the
rearmament protest of the 1950s and the anti-American
protest of the 1960s. ^
The difference with this new generation from that of
the 1950s is an altered international environment where
German attitudes, in the wake of Ostpolitik
,
toward the
United States and the Soviet Union appear to be changing.
As Stephen Szabo concludes, "Postwar Germans are more
distant from the American model and while they harbor few
positive feelings toward either the Soviet Union or the
German Democratic Republic, they also have a lower percep-
tion of military threat from the East than their parents or
OH
grandparents . " J This fact is evident in recent public




"Do you believe that the Russians today have the basic good
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(German Information Center, No. 2
April 1982)
of the West Germans towards the Soviet Union. Concerning
the notion of "Better red than dead" (see Table 3*3) the
figures are even more startling.
TABLE 3.3















nuclear war 36 38 52 52 45
Defend democracy 33 30 28 23 30
Undecided 31 32 20 25 25




In the late 1950s, Edinger and Deutsch assessed the
public mood of the West Germans with respect to the United
States. They concluded that "a majority of German voters
would like to combine American military protection and
friendship with the advantages of neutralism ." J This
assessment is still valid today, and is once again evident
in recent polls. Those respondents who chose neutrality
over remaining in some kind of military alliance were asked
to respond to the following question: "Since you are in
favor of a neutral Germany, would you then welcome the
departure of American troops from Germany?" The results
indicated that:
--38 percent would regret the departure of American
troops
.
--37 percent said it would make no difference either
way.
—24 percent said they would welcome the
departure .
^
The support for an independent course from that of
the United States is strongest among the postwar generation
and, in particular, those young Germans who are well-
educated and politically active. Given the increasing
general economic security along with the insecurity over
nuclear weapons and general distrust of the political
leaders, both German and American, this new generation of
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Germans may find itself caught in the vice of the
"Toqueville effect" where the reversal of a favorite trend
is much less easily accepted than the situation which this
trend had begun. ' What could possibly result from this
confluence of factors might be a situation where "the long-
term existence of our sociopolitical order would come into
38question ." J
B. SOVIET INVOLVEMENT
The Soviet Union's involvement in the West German peace
movement has also been one of continuity and change. In
order to fully understand the nature of this involvement, we
must begin with a brief history of the relations between the
Soviets and Western Europe, particularly the Federal
Republic. At the end of World War II, the Soviets viewed
Western Europe as "both a potential buffer-zone against the
United States and as a hostage to ensure good behavior from
o q
the Amer icans ."
-
>
" At the same time, capitalist West
European societies, especially West Germany, were perceived
as a challenge to the territorial status quo of Eastern
40Europe and to Moscow's dominant position in that area.
This double approach to the Federal Republic--as a
major challenge and a potential partner
—
probably
reflected the fact that West Germany was recognized by
the Soviet leaders not only as economically and
technologically the most powerful state in Western
Europe, but also as a country which, for a number of
reasons, was highly susceptible to Soviet influence.
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The outcome of these perceptions was a Soviet policy
directed primarily at containing West German influence in
Eastern Europe and retaining and increasing some Soviet
leverage in West German affairs. This was accomplished by
the following means:
1) Threatening and, alternatively, conciliatory
initiatives with regard to Berlin and other issues that
relate to the future of Germany;
2) The exploitation of intra -Western differences and
rivalries, both between West European states and between
Western Europe and the United States ; and
3) Concerted actions of indigenous Communist parties
42
and other so-called " peace -loving forces."
Peace
,
as it always appears in the ideological programs
of the Soviet Communist party (CPSU), is presented as the
sum total of diplomacy that is conducted by the Soviet
state. Ideologically, peace exists in a dialectic form,
transforming from peaceful co-existence to its higher form,
which is a permament peace that can only succeed under
classless conditions. In other words, peace for Soviets
must be the continuation of revolution by other means.
Permanent peace is to be obtained by Soviet dominance of the
entire world.
In general, the Soviets are masters in the art of
"active measures" that seek to discredit and weaken the
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United States and other nations so as to affect other
nations' policies. These "active measures" include:
1) written or spoken disinformation;
2) efforts to control media in foreign countries;
3) use of Communist parties and front organizations;
4) clandestine radio broadcasting;
5) blackmail, personal and economic; and
no
6) political influence operations. J
Various approaches used by Moscow include control of the
press in foreign countries, outright and partial forgery of
documents, use of rumors, insinuation, altered facts and
lies, exploitation of a nation's academic, political,
economic and media figures as collaborators to influence
policies of a nation.
According to U.S. government sources, these "active
measures" are integrated with legitimate Soviet foreign
policy, with the decision to use "active measures" being
made at the Politburo level. The activities are designed
and operated within the large and complex bureaucracy of the
KGB and CPSU International Department. Soviet agents are
then assigned the various tasks of implementing the "active
measures". The agents are often official and quasi-official
Soviet representatives, which include academics, students,
and journalists, where official Soviet links are not always




There are two reasons why the Soviets have become
somewhat successful with these activities. First, the
nature of the Soviet system, i.e. the highly centralized
structure of the Soviet state and its complete control over
all elements of the society, gives the Soviet leaders free
use of party, government and private citizens in implement-
ing these "active measures." Second, the open societies of
the Western countries and the ease of access to their news
media often give the Soviets an added advantage.
The Soviets are attempting to use their policy of
"active measures" to gain control of the new peace movement
One method they use is the attempt to join the bandwagon by
starting their own so-called new peace offensive. The
Soviet "peace-offensive", however, is far from being new.
The post-World War II period witnessed the Soviets
attempting to use their peace offensive (circa 19^9) for
political aims:
The Russians have cried peace so often and nearly
always for such sinister reasons that Western
diplomats now automatically look for hidden traps--or
worse— in Moscow's proposals.
As viewed from Washington in 1950, the Soviet peace
offensive was designed to coldly exploit the popular fear
and confusion that was provoked from debates on the new
hydrogen bomb and other mass destructive weapons. It was
perceived by Western sources that the Kremlin believed that
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the peoples of the Western world might ultimately force
their governments into a peace-at-any-price attitude.
The major political aim of the Soviet peace offensive,
with respect to Germany, was to get the Western occupation
armies out and use Red organizations, which had infiltrated
non-Communist parties, to agitate for German unity in terms
that would eventually see West Germany absorbed by the East.
A good case study of Soviet intervention into West
German political affairs took place during the 1957 general
election campaign. As noted earlier, in April of that year,
the Bundestag was debating the issue of atomic weapons.
Concurrent with those debates, the Soviets were playing a
sort of carrot and stick game with the West German govern-
ment. Along with various pronouncements referring to the
"spirit of Rapallo"
,
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko
handed the West German charge d'affaires in Moscow a
threatening note, which stated:
If the nuclear weapons were used, the whole of Western
Germany would become one single cemeter y . . . for the
Federal Republic this is in essence a matter of life
and death .
In further attempts on the Soviets' part to embarass the
Adenauer campaign, Gromyko handed the German Ambassador in
Moscow a Note which "re-emphasized the Russian view of
46




The Federal Republic is now faced with the choice:
Either it renounces its NATO policy and its war
preparations and establishes the unity of Germany
gradually by peaceful means, or else it continues its
present political course, pregnant with extreme danger
for the population of Western Germany, and takes
responsibility of the maintenance and accentuation of
the division of Germany. There is no third
alternative. '
Most of the intervention into the 1957 campaign came
from East Germany, a method that remains active to this day.
Several million propaganda brochures and pamphlets, produced
in the German Democratic Republic, were randomly addressed
to private individuals, to soldiers, young voters and
visitors. Whole bundles of propaganda leaflets were dis-
covered on couriers who visited the Federal Republic. The
attempt on the part of the East Germans to propagandize the
campaign was so extensive that one week prior to election
day, some two hundred and twenty different types of material
were intercepted by the West German security authorities.
Most of the common propaganda consisted of colored stickers
with mottoes such as "Whoever votes for Adenauer, votes also
for atomic war." But the great majority of the Communist
material that was distributed in West Germany was of three
different types. An imitation 10-mark note was printed and
purposefully left on sidewalks. When passers-by picked up
the note, and examined their new-found wealth, the back of
the note revealed the following statement:
This note of course is not genuine. But have you ever
thought about the fact that... of every 10-mark note the
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government takes away 2. 50DM? . . . Not a vote for the
CDU/CSU, the party of tax blackmailers and rearmament
hyenas. Vote SPD! - The Communist Party of Germany. *
Some of the more ingenious kinds of propaganda schemes
included :
1 ) A catalogue for a well-known make of small car which
opened to an argument that the CDU, with its monopolists and
militarists, steered Germany's course.
2) A leaflet make to look like a Post Office notice for
instructions on how to use Savings Bank accounts which
opened to reveal the manifesto of the 1957 KPD Congress.
3) Under the cover of All Quiet on the Western Front
were found forty pages of a Communist version of the
Hungarian revolt and eight pages of photographs of subjects
such as the corpses of Hungarian victims of the "white
counter revolution."
4) Covers depicting poses by actress Marilyn Monroe,
used for speedy circulation, contained Communist propaganda.
5) Various newspapers such as the Neue Bild-Zeitung
copied the layout and features of its Western counterpart,
but presented straight Communist propaganda.
6) In an attempt to cause confusion among draftees,
phony official-looking letters were sent to a large number
of conscripts exempting them from service regardless of
prior or future notification.
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In its continuing effort to utilize their active
measures against West German security policy, the Soviets
intensified their peace offensive to counter the ER weapons
issue and INF. Through their large propaganda apparatus,
the Soviets were able to capitalize on the fear of limited
nuclear war. They stated to the West Germans:
If there is war, that is, if we attack you, Americans
will lay waste to your country and people. Since
defense is impossible without annihilation, you should
quit NATO, cease being pawns of the Americans and come
to peaceful and profitable terms with use.
The delay by President Carter in reaching a final decision
on the production of ER weapons afforded the Soviets the
opportunity to initiate a world-wide campaign to prevent
production of the weapons. Throughout July 1977, the
Soviets, along with the faithful state-controlled media of
Eastern Europe, used the press and radio to spread the
following message:
The ghastly new American weapon, the neutron bomb,
threatens mankind with nuclear extinction. To be for
the neutron bomb is to be for wap. To oppose the
neutron bomb is to be for peace.
In August 1977, the Soviet campaign moved into a more
covert style. The World Peace Council, a well-known Soviet
front organization, was instrumental in promoting public
demonstrations in Bonn, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Istanbul
from August 6-13. Although most of the demonstrators were
motivated by spontaneous emotions of ant i -Americanism
,
pacifism, and a longing for peace, it was apparent that the
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organization and advertising was subtly directed by the
Soviets. 52
The Soviets also left no stone unturned when it came to
methods of pressuring President Carter. Playing upon
Carter's much publicized Baptist ethics and morals, TASS
reported
:
Soviet Baptist leaders today condemned production of
the neutron bomb as 'contrary to the teachings of
Christ' and urged fellow Baptists in the United States
to raise their voices in defense of peace. *
The Soviets view the campaign as being completely
successfuly. The Hungarian chief of the Communist Party's
International Department, Janos Berecz, stated, "The
political campaign against the neutron bomb was one of the
'"5 4
most significant and successful since World War II.
In response to NATO's December 1979 decision to
introduce 572 Cruise and Pershing II missiles into Western
Europe, the Soviets launched another extensive program of
active measures, this time for the purpose of developing an
environment of public opinion opposed to the NATO decision.
Fortunately for the Soviets, large protest movements in
Western Europe already existed.
In this campaign, the Soviets actively used political
and economic pressure to try to persuade various European
countries to oppose the INF modernization plan. In one host
country, the Soviet Ambassador met privately with the
Minister of Commerce to discuss the supply and price of oil
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sold by the Soviet Union to that country. He suggested that
if the host country would oppose INF, the Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Affairs might persuade the Soviet Ministry of Trade
to grant more favorable oil prices. J
Another method of Soviet involvement that proved highly
successful in the campaign against ER weapons has been
either the creation of or backing of several front groups
who oppose the INF decision. In general, these front groups
have lobbied non-Communist participants, including anti-
nuclear groups, pacifists and environmentalists. In some
cases, the activities of these front groups have been
directed by local Communist parties. Two examples of this
type of Soviet involvement are revealed in the acitivites of
the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) and the German
Communist Party (DKP).
The CPN has organized its own front group known as the
Dutch Christians for Socialism. In November 1980, another
CPN-related group called the Dutch Joint Committee--Stop the
Neutron Bomb--Stop the Nuclear Armament Race sponsored an
international forum against nuclear arms in Amsterdam. This
forum succeeded in attracting a variety of non-Communist
groups with the intent to prevent final approval by the
Dutch parliament on INF. In April 1981, the Dutch author-
ities expelled KGB officer Vadim Leonev , who associated
closely with the leaders of the Dutch peace movement. In
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a drunken boast to a Dutch counterintelligence source,
Leonev stated
:
If Moscow decides that 50,000 demonstrators must take
to the streets in the Netherlands, then they take to
the streets. Do you know how you can get 50,000
demonstrators at a certain place within a week? A
message through my channels is sufficient. '
Another example of KGB involvement was the deportation of
Stanislav Chebotek from Norway in November 1981. He was
caught offering bribes to those Norwegians who "would write
letters to newspapers denouncing NATO and the proposed
missiles for Europe."
In the case of Germany, the Soviets have attempted to
infiltrate the various factions of the peace movement.
Towards the end of the 1970s, the Soviets increased their
active measures aimed at influencing public opinion in West
Germany. This led to the establishment of the Department
for International Information, headed by Soviet German
experts such as Leonid Zamyatin and Valentin Falin. The
Soviets hope to influence the West German peace movement by
attempting to discredit the view that pacifists and commun-
ists can't form a coalition. They exert this influence
through the Western Affairs Department of East Germany's SED
to West Germany's counterpart organizations which are known
as K-groups (see Appendix I). It is interesting to note
that the total membership of the DKP is only approximately
M0, 000. During the 1980 general elections they only polled
0.2 percent of the total votes.
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Along with these K-groups , the Soviets have direct
influence upon the front groups that include the World Peace
Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World
Federation of Democratic Youth, and the Women's International
Democratic Federation. To complement those organizations
that are known for their pro-Soviet bias, the Soviets have
also indirectly sponsored various petitions and appeals
calling for an end to nuclear arms in Western Europe. One
such occassion known as the Krefeld Appeal, which collected
almost 2 million signatures, was partially funded by the
Soviets through the East German SED and the German Peace
Union. Since the West German peace movement is poorly
funded from its own sources, it cautiously accepts money from
the Communists
.
At present, the target of Soviet active measures in West
Germany still remains directed at the growing popularity of
the peace movement. The fundamental problem that exists
between the Moscow-oriented Communists and the peace move-
ment is the Communists' criticism of pacifist attitudes
toward the use of weapons. According to the Communist argu-
ment, "it is impossible to believe in the possibility of
preventing a war through conviction and persuasion alone,"
an attitude that "could harm the working class and hence the
objectives of the USSR." 62 The Soviets, therefore, direct




West European societal forces are to be harnessed to
the Soviet-controlled world movement. In the first
phase, broad masses of the public are to be induced to
join the struggle against war and thus act as a ,
reliable barrier in the path of possible aggression. ^
Some of the non-Soviet-influenced factions within the
peace movement are well aware of the Soviet Union's attempts
to control the anti-nuclear movement. For example, Gerd
Bastian, a retired Bundeswehr general and a chief advisor to
the Greens party on military affairs, stated in an interview
that the Greens party is actively seeking ways to isolate
the Soviet involvement. In April 1982, however, the Greens
admitted and complained that the Communists (probably
referring to the K-groups) has already taken over the
planning of the anti-Reagan demonstrations that were held in
64Bonn later in June.
The Soviets have been quicker than Washington to assess
the changing mood of the West Germans. The late Leonid
Brezhnev dispatched scores of Soviet officials to West
Germany for the purpose of presenting Moscow's peace
propaganda, which included some previous, but still luring
statements made by Kosygin in 1957:
The Soviet Union will under no circumstances use
nuclear weapons againstj-States . . . that do not have such
weapons on their soil. ^
The Soviet peace offensive has been a continuing attempt
at discrediting U.S. commitment to Western Europe as well as
isolating NATO from the European mainstream. Although some
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of the short-range objectives of the peace offensive have
changed, the long-range objective of Soviet hegemony
throughout all of Europe and ultimately the entire world
still remains.
Many Europeans are no longer eying the Soviet peace
offensive in terms of trickery and deceit. On the contrary,
a very favorable position of detente between the Soviets and
the West Germans was born out of the offensive. In 1978 and
1979, Soviet diplomacy worked to negotiate a series of
bilateral long-term economic and political agreements with
all the major countries in Western Europe, except for Great
Britain. For its part, the Soviets are carrying out their
desire to project the illusion of a constant move towards
peace
.
The Soviet Union's entire peace policy could be
described in terms of a shifting of political and
diplomatic forums, from one place to another: using
any means... to wear down the fundamental East-West
dichotomies ... to replace them with a web of substitute
agreements ... like Helsinki or the Nordic non-nuclear
idea .
One of the more remarkable aspects of this diplomatic
behavior is that it has resulted not in condemnation
of Soviet attitudes, but that it has had precisely the
opposite effect.
The majority of the European peace movement may never
understand the nature of the Soviet involvement. The
activities that were discussed will probably continue to go
unnoticed, as well as the reality of the Soviet's ultimate
goal, which is undoubtedly not peace as we know it.
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Once again, it is still too early to make any
assessments on the success or failure of the anti-INF
campaign, especially with regard to the Soviet involvement.
One fact, however, remains quite clear. The mixture of
Communists, Trotskyites and militant anarchists, who wish to
manipulate the peace movement so as to bring about the rapid
downfall of the Western Alliance, all provide an excellent
opportunity for the Soviets to enjoy the rewards of three
decades of intervention on the West European continent.
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IV. CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
The central focus of this thesis has been directed
towards a comparison of three phases of opposition to
security policy with the Federal Republic of Germany in an
attempt to establish whether the most recent phase of
opposition (1977-1982) possesses the most potential for
influencing West German decision-making.
In summary, the first phase (1950-1955) witnessed the
beginning of postwar protest over rearmament, where the SPD
strenuously opposed the policy:
It was a time when successive reunification offers on
the part of the Soviet Union fell on semireceptive ears
in a Social Democratic Party...
The Social Democrats opposed rearmament, not merely out of a
certain traditional internationalism, but due to their
concern for the unity and integrity of the entire German
nation. Ollenhauer never intended to lead the Federal
Republic towards neutralism. The possibility for reunifica-
tion, however, was his first and foremost priority. He
stated, "We are thinking about new negotiations ... about the
creation of a collective security system which will preserve




For its part, the CDU under the leadership of Adenauer
adopted the policy of rearmament, not merely out of anti-
communist sentiments, but due to a desire for European
economic and political integration which superceded the
3
national concept. Adenauer was concerned with safeguarding
freedom, the most essential value, where "territorial inte-
grity, freedom of action in foreign policy, and freedom of
domestic self-determination were necessary conditions for the
existence of the country and its people, and, therefore, an
4
absolute priority, which had to be defended accordingly."
The consequence was the loss of an opportunity for early
reunification. The divergence in politcal priorities,
defense versus detente and disarmament, which took shape
during the rearmament debates, created a lasting dilemma in
the formulation of security policy within the Federal
Republic. On a positive note, however, the economic
resurgence of West Germany, coupled with the recognition of
the Federal Republic's sovereignty by the Western powers,
brought a recovery of German prestige, and with it the
failure of the opposition's attempt to foil the plans for
rearmament
.
The second phase of opposition (1957-1958) witnessed the
beginning of other problems that currently plague domestic
politics, as well as defense policy within West Germany.
The shift of U.S. policy in 1956 towards the replacement of
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ground troops with nuclear weapons gave rise to the
"decoupling" trauma which haunts Europe's NATO allies to
this day. Once again West German policy was caught in a
painful domestic and strategic squeeze. Unlike the options
of peace in freedom or reunification that clearly charac-
terized the first phase of opposition, this phase was
characterized by the alarm of many West German citizens over
the possibilities of "atomic death." The appeal by 18 West
German scientists certainly provided the stimulus for the
debate in the Bundestag, between the Adenauer government and
the SPD opposition.
The "Fight Atomic Death" movement rapidly developed with
the support of the Social Democrats and the German Trade
Union Federation, along with many scientists, artists, and
intellectuals. Although the movement carried out numerous
rallies and demonstrations, it failed to prevent the nuclear
weapons from being placed on West German soil. The movement
lost momentum and most of its political clout due to the
following reasons:
1) The July 1958 Federal Constitutional Court ruling
against a referendum on nuclear armament
;
2) The CDU gained an absolute majority in the Land
elections of North-Rhine Westphalia, a traditional
stronghold of the SPD;
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3) The Soviet Union's "Berlin Ultimatum" of November
1958; and
4) The withdrawal from the movement by the SPD and
Trade Union Federation, after the SPD was out-voted by left-
wing forces at the Berlin Student Congress against atomic
weapons in January 1959.
The third phase of opposition (1977-1982) demonstrates
that there has been a continuity of the peace movement , but
"a continuity diminished by the fact that various tendencies
have had to regroup from time to time around new themes."
This new peace movement can be distinguished from the prior
two phases of opposition by its broader-based organization
and international appeal. The new peace movement also
demonstrates a dynamic force that was not present in the
earlier campaigns. This dynamism is a set of complex
politico-sociological factors that encompass the attitudes
of the postwar, postmaterialist generation of West Germans.
This feature of the new peace movement deserves our fullest
attention, for one has only to recall the effects that other
past radical German thinkers have had on society, such as
Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Feuerbach, Hegel and Nietzsche.
Other alternatives to INF, which include varieties of
conventional defenses, and pacifist notions of unilateral
withdrawals, can all be dealth with on a rational basis.
But a new danger is mounting in West Germany. Gerhard
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Wettig of the Federal Institute for Eastern and
International Studies writes:
The most disquieting element [of the new movement] lies
in the fact that the peace movement's following now
increasingly includes groupings that are generally
closed to political considerations and thought
categories. These groups view peace and armament
issues purely in the light of personal psychothera-
peutic criteria .. .Moreover , they regard themselves as a
morally superior counter-culture in relation to the
established politicians and political go-getters.
With respect to security policy, this "alternative-
culture" seeks to overcome (what they term) the senseless
strategy of maintaining peace through the possession of
global destruction capabilities. The Alternatives, however,
have not offered any feasible answers. Wettig points out
that "it would be very dangerour indeed if an unrealistic
idealism in matters of security policy were to combine...
with the fermentation agent of environmental protection" to
replace a rational solution "to the peace and armament
problem. If this were the case, the Federal Republic of
Q
Germany could slip into the Soviet sphere of influence..."
It is too early to measure the effect of the opposition
to INF, in terms of success or failure to change the current
policy. We have, however, examined the political base of
the peace movement which provides us with some insight into
the prospects for the future of the Federal Republic.
Given the desires of the pacifists and SPD left, should the
peace movement be successful in stopping the Cruise and
1 10

Pershing II missiles from arriving, the Federal Republic
could be more inclined to favor an anti-American, Socialist,
and neutralist policy.
A recent book entitled The End of the Ideological Age by
Peter Bender, hypothesizes that a neutral Europe is both
possible and desirable. The Western alliance system, then,
is to be continued solely because it provides the structure
q
under which this peaceful transformation can take place.
The lack of credibility in Bender's neutral option is
readily seen in the following passage from his book:
...if it [Europe] would no longer house either
missiles or radio facilities that can reach into
Soviet territory ... if neither human rights nor Polish
or Czech models were used as political weapons, then
there would be a prospect that the Kremlin would permit
democracy to come right up to the frontiers of the
Soviet empire .
With the current shift of the SPD to the left, this
nationalist, neutralist position comes more clearly into
focus. The fate of the SPD, particularly the SPD left,
therefore, holds profound implications for the future
security policies of the Federal Republic.
The question then arises as to what can be done, by both
the United States and the pro-NATO elements within the
Federal Republic, to stop these developments from occurring.
With respect to the "alternative-culture", the German
government cannot ignore the "groundswells" of discontent
and press on regardless. They should begin their efforts by
11 1

talking to their young people, though the dialogue may prove
1 1difficult, if not impossible. Hans Ruhle offers a good
summary of solutions to these problems as they relate to the
NATO alliance:
1) Facilities for mutual learning must be created in
which friendships and understanding for the other side's
interests can grow.
2) The partners in transatlantic dialogue must be
truthful not only to their opponents but also to each other.
3) The NATO states must unify the goals and
perspectives of social policy.
4) The threat [Soviet] must be made visible again... not
where it no longer exists nor need it be exaggerated.
5) The alliance must be shown that (when compared to
economic demands) security has a natural priority in the
list of national responsibilities .. .the maintenance of life
and freedom of its citizens.
6) Security is no longer available dirt-cheap. The
Atlantic Alliance will only survive if all the partners help
1 2bear each others' burdens.
In the final analysis, the new peace movement in West
Germany and the pressures that it can bring to bear upon the
security policy of the Federal Republic are not to be taken
lightly. With an already declining German-American
relationship, the future of West German security becomes
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even more uncertain. The German debate over INF has by no
means reached its zenith, and given the increasing economic
difficulties, the introduction of the weapons could spell
only the beginning of West Germany's domestic turmoil.
Although stresses are inevitable in any alliance, it is
important for Americans to realize that West German
attitudes are changing. The post-war generation no longer
feels responsible for the Hilter era and, unlike their
fathers and uncles, they do not feel special obligations to
the United States. Politically aware young Germans appear
to be proud of the Federal Republic's achievements since
World War II, but at the same time are painfully aware of
their vulnerability should war ever break out.
The best policy for the security of the Federal Republic
is to remain a staunch ally with the United States. But
American misperceptions of German attitudes, coupled with
inconsistencies in U.S. foreign policy, have raised basic
doubts in West Germany about America's willingness to defend
Western Europe. If these doubts continue to grow, the
recommendations of the peace movement (e.g., a nuclear-
freeze or unilateral disarmament) may receive more attention
and, if implemented, could lead to the eventual disintegra-
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EKD- Evangelical Church of Germany
DKP- German Communist Party (40,000 members)
SDAJ- Socialist German Workers' Youth (15,000 members)
MSB- Marxist Student League (6,000 members)
JP- Young Pioneers (2,000 members)
VVN-BDA- League of Anti-Fascists (10,000 members)
DFU- German Peace Union (3,000 members)
VDJ- Association of Democratic Jews (?)
DFGIVK- German Peace Society/United War Resistors (14,500
members
)
DFI- Democratic Women's Initiative (?)
UFAZ- Committee for Peace, Disarmament and Cooperation
KBW- Communist League of West Germany (1400 members)
BWK- League of West German Communists (600 members)
KB- Communist League (300 members)
KPD- Communist Party of Germany (500 members)
TAZ- Tageszeitung (Dialy Newspaper)
-K -Groups
information obtained from an interview with Dr. Friedhelm





THE HEIDELBERG THESES 1959
Thesis 1
World Peace has become a condition for living in the
technological age.
Thesis 2
The Christian must require himself to make a special
contribution to the establishment of peace.
Thesis 3
War must be abolished by persistent and progressive effort
Thesis 4
Active participation in this work
simple and most obvious duty.
Thesis 5
for peace is our most
The way to world peace runs through an area in which the
justice and freedom are endangered because the traditional
justification for war is no longer valid.
Thesis 6
We must try to understand the different conscientious
arms in this dilemma asdecisions taken about nuclear
complementary actions.
Thesis 7
The Church must recognize the renunciation of arms as a
Christian way of acting.
Thesis 8
The Church must recognize participation in the attempt to
safeguard peace in freedom by the presence of nuclear





For a soldier in an Army equipped with nuclear weapons it is
true
131 .
that: if you say » a 1 you must expect to have to say
but woe to the irresponsible!
Thesis 10
If the Church speaks at all on world politics, it should
make clear the necessity of a peaceful order to the states
with nuclear weapons and advise those without nuclear
weapons not to try to acquire them.
Thesis 11
Not everyone must do the same thing, but everyone must know




LIST OF PROMINENT SIGNERS TO THE GERMAN PEACE APPEAL
Heinrich Albertz, pastor and former mayor of Berlin
Gerd Bastian, retired majorgeneral of the Bundeswehr
Rudolf Bindig, Member of Parliament
Heinrich Boll, author and Nobel-Prize winner
Volkmar Deile, clergyman and exec, director "Aktion
Suhnezeichen/Freidensdienste"
Erhard Eppler, former minister of development of FRG
Anton A. Fischer, member of the exec, committee of the FDP
Martin Hirsch, judge of supreme court
Petra Kelly, chairperson "Die Griinen"
Prof. Jurgen Kunze, member state legislature and chairperson
of FDP Berlin
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